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A reputation for resolve, used to predict an actor’s future intentions with reasonable 
accuracy based on his past actions, is central to many deterrence theories. The 
assumption is that states use other actors’ past behavior as a learning schema for 
generating expectations, and act according to such expectations. However, there are other 
powerful determinants in international politics—military capabilities, distribution of 
power, and interests at stake, etc.—that shape states’ policies. Nonetheless, decision 
makers assign to their states’ reputation the status of symbolic capital, in order to add 
credibility to their future threats and commitments, or to credibly deter adversaries’ 
future threats. They generally believe that their allies and adversaries infer the state’s 
resolve from its past behavior. In this paper we analyze how this belief and the 
consequent quest for building, preserving, and/or restoring reputation can push decision-
makers into the vortex of conflicts. 
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In international relations, states pay close attention to actions of allies and competitors 
alike. Statesmen believe a tough response in one crisis gives the state a reputation for 
resolve that is likely to serve as a deterrent for any future challenger. Conversely, any 
retreat or weakness displayed by a state under a crisis will leave it with a reputation for 
irresoluteness that will likely embolden its competitors in the future. 
Proponents of this hypothesis believe that a country’s reputation has a significant 
effect on its credibility. Conventional wisdom and much of the deterrence literature 
assume that a reputation for resolve is often necessary for preventing war, and regime 
scholars emphasize how a state’s reputation influences its ability to form and preserve 
international institutions. However, some scholars question the validity of the hypothesis. 
They believe that reputations do not generally influence other states’ policies, and that 
adversaries and allies do not necessarily view the same act by an actor similarly; hence, 
reputations rarely form and are not worth fighting for. 
Most policy-makers, nonetheless, appear influenced by reputation, or the 
perceived importance of reputation. States have thus reacted strongly even on matters of 
trivial strategic interests in order to communicate resoluteness to the challenger of the 
moment, as well as to potential future challengers. In the process, states have actually 
employed war with the purpose of deterring future wars. 
This thesis investigates the perceived role reputation plays in international 
relations, with special focus on its connection to deterrence outcomes. Discussions of 
reputation have largely focused on whether and how significantly reputation matters in 
international relations in general, and whether reputation is worth fighting for. We intend 
to explore the issue from a different angle: regardless of its significance, states have 
actually been going to war for the sake of their reputations for resolve with the belief that 
such reputations supposedly would deter others from initiating hostile actions. We 
propose through this thesis that states can increasingly employ war itself in order to 
develop, preserve, and/or restore a reputation for resolve and credibility. 
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I. REPUTATION HYPOTHESIS IN PERSPECTIVE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Reputational concerns feature heavily in economics. A firm with a poor reputation 
for quality or delivery of service will soon find itself out of business. Similarly, 
monopolists and oligopolists discourage potential new entrants into the market through 
developing a reputation for toughness: “If a monopolist fights the first entrant, it 
generates a reputation for strong resolve and can deter future challenges.”1 Likewise, 
criminal law uses punishment not only to punish the offender, but also essentially to deter 
potential future offenders. Reputation is equally critical in domestic politics, especially 
democracies; a reputation for unfulfilled rhetoric and promises will most likely be the 
cause of the political fall of a leader. States, similarly, respond in differing ways to 
secessionist movements. While some insurgencies, especially in somewhat ethnically 
homogeneous societies, are addressed politically, ethnolinguistically heterogeneous and 
fractionalized states that face the possibility of challenges from multiple other separatist 
groups are likely to fight against them with ruthless military might with a view to 
developing reputation of intolerance towards any secessionist ambitions.2 
The Mytilenian Debate3 is the best illustration of how reputational concerns 
impact states’ decisions that can influence other states’ policies in the future. In this 
debate, Cleon advocated putting to death all the adult male population, and enslaving the 
women and children of Mytilene, to deter future revolts. Diodotus, on the other hand, 
argued that such an action would make any future revolt more desperate and, hence, 
determined. The concept was expanded by Thomas Schelling who “laid the foundation 
for a reputational theory of conflict behavior, claiming that a state’s reputation for 
1 Joe Clare and Vesna Danilovic, “Multiple Audiences and Reputation Building in International 
Conflicts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (2010), 864. 
2 Ibid., 864–5. 
3 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, New York: E. P. Dutton, Book 3, 212–223. 
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resolve, established through its past behavior, should provide it with bargaining leverage 
in future conflicts.”4 
Of great interest to academia in recent years is whether reputations matter in 
international relations, especially under crises. Opinion is divided on whether and how 
significantly reputations shape policies and the responses of states. Proponents of 
reputations advance the concept that if a state fails to punish an aggressor, its reputation 
will suffer, and, as a result, future deterrent threats will be less believable.5 Likewise, 
accepting “defeat” can be similarly damaging. For example, the U.S. withdrawal from 
Iraq was opposed, inter alia, out of reputational concerns. “For those who oppose a rapid 
U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, including members of the Bush administration, among the 
most feared consequences is damage to America’s reputation.”6 
Others contest this strategic utility of reputation. They believe that decision 
makers rarely assess the credibility of their adversary’s threats through reference to a 
history for keeping or breaking commitments, that reputations rarely form, and thus 
cannot have, strategic utility, and hence reputation is not worth fighting for.7 
Regardless of which school is closer to reality, there appears to be a tendency 
among decision makers to take their own state’s reputation seriously, and even go to war 
to earn or maintain it. This strong belief that is pervasive among decision makers has 
turned it into the cult of reputation—”a belief system holding as its central premise a 
conviction (or fear) that backing down in a crisis will lead one’s adversaries or allies to 
underestimate one’s resolve in the next crisis.”8 It is this belief that renders reputational 
considerations important motives for war. 
4 Joe Clare, “Reputation for Resolve, Interests, and Conflict,” Conflict Management and Peace 
Science 2012 29: 3. 
5 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), 
120. 
6 Hakan Tunç, “Reputation and U.S. withdrawal from Iraq,” Orbis 52, no. 4 (2008): 657–669. 
7 Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 1. 
8 Shiping Tang, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies, 14:1, 
34–62.  
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The logic is familiar: based on a state’s behavior in one dispute (e.g., 
giving into Hitler’s demands at Munich), potential adversaries and allies 
make inferences about its likely behavior in future disputes (further 
appeasement); in anticipation of such reputational consequences, states 
alter their behavior (stand up to aggressors instead of appeasing them).9 
Policy-makers worldwide, and more so among the great powers, have been 
overwhelmed by this assumption, even if it meant going to war to build or preserve a 
reputation. Thus, the quest for reputation drawn from this assumption, or the cult of 
reputation, can precipitate more wars. 
Against a backdrop of such opposing ideas, we intend to answer the following 
questions: What do we mean by the term “reputation of states”? What is the reputation 
hypothesis, and do we have an alternative explanation for states’ actions/responses? What 
is the interplay of reputation and coercion, and to what degree can the reputation of states 
successfully deter war? Alternatively, can building, maintaining, and restoring a 
reputation for resolve—the cult of reputation—lead to more wars? 
B. DO REPUTATIONS MATTER? 
That reputation is a valuable commodity in economics for both individual and 
firms is established. However, whether it is as valuable in international relations is 
disputed. But before we discuss the competing hypotheses on the strategic utility of 
reputation, it is important to know what we actually understand by the term. 
1. Reputation 
John Hutson defines a man’s reputation as “what is said about him. It is the 
overall response of people to both actor and role performance; an assessment not only of 
the results achieved but also of the manner in which they were achieved.”10 Similarly, 
one study in business literature defines reputation as “information about an agent that 
9 Allan Dafoe and Devin Caughey, “Honor and War: Southern U.S. Presidents and the Effects of 
Concern for Reputation,” in Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, vol. 25. 2012. 
10 John Hutson, “A Politician in Valloire,” in Gifts and Poison: The Politics of Reputation, ed. F. G. 
Bailey (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971), 79. 
 3 
                                                 
develops over time from observed behavior about some characteristic of the agent.”11 In 
a most parsimonious yet comprehensive definition, “a reputation is a judgment of 
someone’s character (or disposition) that is then used to predict or explain future 
behavior.”12 For the purpose of this thesis, we will refer to reputation as an understanding 
of a state/leader’s past behavior that is used to predict future behavior. 
Some scholars treat “reputation” and “credibility” distinctly:  
[Reputation is] an umbrella term that refers to any belief about a trait or 
behavioral tendency of an actor, based on that agent’s past behavior…. [While 
credibility is] the extent to which an actor’s statement or implicit commitments 
are believed. Credibility often refers to the extent to which others believe an actor 
will carry out an explicit or implicit threat.13 
However, since reputation is (supposedly) employed to either render credibility to 
coercive threats, or to resist such threats, we will, with a view to avoiding this semantic 
confusion, use reputation and credibility interchangeably. 
2. Reputation Hypothesis 
The Reputation Hypothesis posits that a country’s reputation has a significant 
effect on its credibility in international relations, and its past behavior is used to predict or 
explain its future behavior. The extrapolation principle supports this hypothesis: “The 
fundamental appeal and importance of this concept…is that reputations allow actors to 
predict others’ future moves during strategic interaction according to the ‘extrapolation 
principle.’”14 
11 Keith Chauvin and James Guthrie, “Labor Market Reputation and the Value of the Firm,” 
Managerial and Decision Economics 15, no. 6 (November–December 1994): 544. 
12 Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 6. 
13 Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, “Reputation and status as motives for war,” 
Political Science 17, no. 1 (2014):  371. 
14 Jason C. Sharman, “Rationalist and Constructivist Perspectives on Reputation,” Political Studies 55, 
no. 1 (2007), 20. C.C. von Weizsacker defines the notion of extrapolation principle as: “the phenomenon 
that people extrapolate the behaviour of others from past observations and this extrapolation is self-
stabilizing, because it provides an incentive to live up to these expectations…. By observing others’ 
behaviour in the past, one can fairly confidently predict their behaviour in the future without incurring 
further costs.” C. C. von Weizsacker, Barriers to Entry (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1980), 72. 
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There are two possible versions of the hypothesis that have been developed in 
relation to the role of reputation in international relations. At the broadest level, one 
version holds that a state’s actions in one crisis have long-lasting and broad effects on its 
credibility far into the future, including in crises under any set of situations that occur 
anywhere around the world. This argument overwhelmingly focuses on a state’s 
reputation for resolve, based on its past behavior in meeting challenges in international 
disputes and crises, as well as honoring its commitments. The perception of such resolve 
and commitment creates strong beliefs in adversaries and allies alike about the state’s 
expected behavior in future crises. The reputation of a state so developed heavily 
influences an adversary’s decisions on whether to challenge the state through coercion, or 
resist its coercive threats. Likewise, such reputations also influence potential allies’ 
decisions in alliance formation. 
Proponents of this version of the Reputation Hypothesis argue that if a state failed 
to punish an aggressor, the state’s reputation would suffer, and, as a result, future 
deterrent threats would be less believable.15 States should act out of reputational 
motivations; past behavior has the power to demonstrate a state’s resolve and 
resoluteness to carry out (or resist) a threat and honor its commitments; other states use 
this past behavior of a state to predict its future behavior.16 They fear that any display of 
irresoluteness in one crisis would seriously erode a state’s credibility to act resolutely in 
future crises. 
The second approach is the narrower version of the Reputation Hypothesis. It 
argues that adversaries and allies are likely to draw reputational inferences about resolve 
from the past behavior of a state only under certain conditions constrained by the time-
period and similarity of the crisis in which the reputation was earned. The insight 
afforded by this model is the expectation that decision makers will use only certain types 
of information when drawing inferences about reputations, and an adversary or ally 
updates and revises its beliefs when the unanticipated behavior of a state cannot be 
explained by case-specific variables. Table 1 best explains the two versions. 
15 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 35–43. 
16Ibid., 124. 
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Table 1.   Versions of Reputation Hypothesis.17 
Condition Narrower Version of 
Reputation Hypothesis 
Broader Version of Reputation 
Hypothesis 
Geography Actions in one part of the world 
affect credibility in that part of 
the world 
Actions in one part of the world 
affect credibility everywhere 
Timings Actions in one crisis affect 
credibility for a short period of 
time 
Action in one crisis affect 
credibility long into the future 
Similarity of 
Issues 
Actions in one crisis affect 
credibility in future crises over 
similar issues 
Action in one crisis affect 




Actions in one crisis affect 
credibility in future crises 
involving similar stakes 
Actions in one crisis affect 
credibility in future crises 
involving any level of stakes 
Identity of 
Countries 
Actions in one crisis affect 
credibility in future crises 
involving the same two countries 
Actions in one crisis affect 
credibility in future crises 
involving any other countries 
Same Leaders 
#1 
Actions in one crisis affect 
credibility in future crises until 
one’s own leaders change 
Actions in one crisis affect 
credibility in future crises even 
after one’s own leaders change 
Same Leaders 
#2 
Actions in one crisis affect 
credibility in future crises until 
the leaders of one’s new 
adversary change 
Actions in one crisis affect 
credibility in future crises even 




Actions in one crisis affect 
credibility if they create a pattern 
of repeated behavior (e.g., 
repeatedly backing down or 
repeatedly keeping 
commitments) 
Single instances of backing down 
or keeping commitments 
substantially affect credibility in 
future crises 
 
A state’s resolve to go to war is private or incomplete information, and states in 
crises typically resort to signaling and posturing to demonstrate their resolve. However, 
“signals…are [intended] mainly to influence receiver’s perception of the sender…. They 
do not contain inherent credibility.”18 Hence, besides the observables like the country’s 
17 Daryl G. Press, “Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility During the Cuban Missile 
Crisis,” in Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, August 2001, 
9. 
18 Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1970), 18, 20–21. 
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strength, its ability to carry out the threat, and its ability to defend against the other’s 
response, observers fall back on the actor’s reputation based on past behavior as 
a state’s action in one crisis ‘commits’ it to similar behavior in another 
crisis, and, in this way, states can show their resolve and overcome the 
informational problems in crisis bargaining.19 
In addition, states can cultivate a reputation for lowering the costs they are ready 
to pay in pursuit of their interests more than they actually are.20 States thus fight back 
against certain challenges of a peripheral nature to prevent additional depredations in the 
future.21 Some scholars, however, argue that a state’s behavior towards other states is 
shaped by other factors, and that reputations do not influence such a behavior in any 
meaningful way. 
3. The Power/Interest Hypothesis 
The Power/Interests Hypothesis—in rejecting the Reputation Hypothesis—posits 
that decision makers assess the credibility of their adversaries’ threats by evaluating the 
current balance of power—specific configuration of military capabilities, interests at 
stake, and political constraints they face—without reference to the adversary’s history for 
keeping or breaking commitments. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis validates this hypothesis. Three main arguments 
presented to support this claim are as following.22 Bluffing and backing down by the 
Soviets during 1958 to 1962 did not erode their credibility. To the contrary, U.S. decision 
makers were remarkably unified in the assessment of Soviet credibility, stemming 
essentially from the nuclear balance of power, throughout the crisis. While U.S. decision 
19 Joe Clare and Vesna Danilovic. “Reputation for Resolve, Interests, and Conflict,” Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 29, no. 1 (2012), 5. 
20 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Expansion of War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (Summer 
1995), 400.  
21 Todd S. Sechser, “Coercive Threats and Reputation-Building in International Crises,” Manuscript, 
University of Virginia (2013), 1. 
22 Press, ‘Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility During the Cuban Missile Crisis.” 
Shiping Tang too echoes the same findings: “a state rarely underestimates its adversary’s reputation even if 
the adversary has backed down in previous standoffs.” (Tang, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and 
International Conflict,” 42.) 
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makers were focused on Berlin and obsessed with U.S. credibility and reputation because 
of the outcome of this crisis, they never discussed the pattern of Soviet withdrawals 
during the Berlin Crises as an indicator of Soviet credibility. What they discussed, 
however, was the relative power in the Caribbean and Western Europe, and the Soviet 
nuclear capability. The Reputation Hypothesis would predict that the Soviet should 
buckle in response to a blockade or direct U.S. attack on Cuba, and the U.S. needed not 
concede much to the Soviets. Instead, the U.S. conceded to both of demands of 
Khrushchev to pledge not to invade Cuba in the future, and for a removal of Jupiter 
missiles from Turkey. 
While the role of power and interests at stake in assessing the credibility of states 
is hard to dismiss, the claim that past history of keeping or breaking commitments does 
not altogether inform an actor’s future behavior appears specious; hence, the attempt by 
Sechser to adapt the hypotheses. 
4. Common Ground—Reputation-Interest Model 
This model is an attempt to adapt the Reputation and Interest hypotheses. The 
assumption is that 
two observable factors—a state’s past reputation and its interests at stake 
in the current crisis—shape an adversary’s ex ante beliefs about its resolve 
and, as a result, influence the magnitude of reputational costs a state would 
pay for backing down.23 
This leads to the hypothesis that with an increase in the interests at stake, 
states with reputations for irresoluteness are more likely to issue threats; with each 
increase in their interests at stake, threats by both states with resoluteness and 
irresoluteness are less likely to be resisted; and with an increase in the interests at 
stake, states with a reputation for irresoluteness are more likely to send costlier 
signals when issuing threats.24 
23 Clare and Danilovic. “Reputation for Resolve, Interests, and Conflict,” 9. 
24Ibid., 14–15. 
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5. Do Reputations Form? Reputation and Psychology 
Since states invest in reputation to deter future challenges, and “reputation 
building often takes the form of a costly behavior,”25 it is important to understand how 
reputations are formed, and whether these really are formed. It is also important, as 
reputations can matter only if these can be built, altered, and “sold.” 
Reputation is essentially a second-order belief—one in which a group of 
observers hold some belief; it can thus be categorized “as a psychological phenomenon 
because it is rooted in the murky realm of cognitive processes.”26 Thus, it is logical to 
fall on psychology to understand reputation formation. 
Jonathan Mercer’s seminal Reputation and International Relations, despite its 
inherent flaws and some contradictions, is currently the most inclusive work on the 
formation of reputation. He argues that actions attributed to one’s disposition or nature 
tend to recur unless a compelling situation demands otherwise, whereas situational 
attributions—actions necessitated or imposed by circumstances or situation—do not 
contribute towards reputation building since they “do not have cross-situation validity 
[these need to be judged for their contextual compatibility]…. [Hence] only dispositional 
attributions can generate reputation.”27 However, since “a dispositional attribution is 
necessary but not sufficient for a reputation to form,”28 he reasons, “a reputation for 
resolve forms when two conditions are met: First, an observer must explain the target’s 
behavior as a function of its character (or disposition) [not situation]; second, the 
observer must use this explanation to predict or explain the target’s future behavior”29 
(emphasis added). 
25 Sechser, “Coercive Threats and Reputation-Building in International Crises,” 1. 
26 McMahon, “Credibility and world power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar 
American Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History 15, no. 4 (1991), 457. 
27 Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 7. Edward John, while agreeing that situational 
attributions do not have cross-situation validity, however, dismisses situational attributions altogether, and 
opines that “the notion that situations can cause action is abstract and derivative, almost metaphoric in its 
implications.” (Edward E. Jones, “The Rocky Road from Acts to Dispositions,” American Psychologist 34, 
no. 2 (1979): 107–117. 
28 Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 6. 
29 Ibid., 45. 
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Applying psychology, Mercer builds on these two propositions and advances his 
Desire Hypothesis, which posits that desirability or undesirability of behavior affects the 
interpretation of the same behavior. He postulates that, “desirable out-group behavior 
elicits situational explanations, and undesirable out-group behavior elicits dispositional 
explanations.”30 Thus, adversaries can only get a reputation for resolve, since their 
standing firm, being undesirable, will elicit dispositional explanations while backing 
down and being desirable will elicit situational explanations and will be wished away. On 
the other hand, allies can only get a reputation for lacking resolve since their backing 
down or being undesirable will elicit dispositional explanations while standing firm and 
being desirable will elicit situational explanations. As a result, “…while adversaries can 
get reputations for having resolve, they rarely get reputations for lacking resolve; and 
while allies can get reputations for lacking resolve, they rarely get reputations for having 
resolve.”31 Accordingly, states are predisposed to always judge adversaries as resolute, 
while viewing allies with suspicion. 
Such an approach toward formation of reputation has a fundamental limitation of 
its rigidity and a strict categorization of adversaries and allies (while making no 
allowance for the neutral actors).32 Nonetheless, the arguments presented are based on 
human nature—how actors assimilate information. Deep-seated perceptions and beliefs 
are difficult to alter; there is a general “tendency for people to assimilate new information 
to their preexisting beliefs, to see what they expect to be present. Ambiguous or even 
discrepant information is ignored, misperceived, or reinterpreted so that it does minimum 
damage to what the person already believes.”33 Thus, from a psychological standpoint, 
the claim that reputations rarely form may not be entirely incorrect—at least among 
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid., 10. 
32 Dale C. Copeland, “Do Reputations Matter?,” Security Studies 7, no. 1 (1997): 33–71. Copeland 
proceeds to propose an alternative framework that allows for beginning with neutral belief. Herein an actor 
learns about the other sequentially by observing the other’s past behavior (tied to its regime type and 
leaders), and the its geopolitical position, including its relative power, its geographic proximity, and the 
polarity and military technology of the system, that leads, in turn, to an evaluation of the other’s character 
or disposition (its cost and risk-tolerance, its motives) as well as of the other’s situation, including 
opportunities and threats, causally shaping it into either adversary or ally. 
33 Jervis, “Deterrence and Perception,” 24. 
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adversaries. We already discussed in the previous section that bluffing and backing down 
during the Berlin Crises did not in any way impact Soviet reputation. 
Whether reputations form, “all states worry about their reputation for resolve to 
some degree.”34 The Prospect Theory may help explain the tendency. 
C. PROSPECT THEORY AND REPUTATION 
Originally developed in the field of economics as an alternative to the expected 
utility as a theory of decision under risk, Prospect Theory has emerged as a leading 
behavioral theory applied in international relations and political science to explain 
choices that other theories found hard to rationally explain. The theory is functional given 
the finding that “individual choices are as much a function of consistent heuristics and 
biases as they are the result of calculated costs and benefits.”35 
1. Prospect Theory 
This theory posits that, 
individuals evaluate outcomes with respect to deviations from a reference 
point rather than with respect to net asset levels, that their identification of 
this reference point is a critical variable, that they give more weight to 
losses than to comparable gains, and that they are generally risk-averse 
with respect to gains and risk-acceptant with respect to losses.36  
2. Reputation—A Prospect Theoretical Analysis 
Purely from the definition, Prospect Theory would prima facie predict that states 
with reputations for strong resolve developed through their past actions should be risk-
acceptant towards any attempted erosion of their credibility, as it pushes them into the 
losses frame. Conversely, states with weak reputations may tend to be risk-averse 
towards building a reputation for resolve, as that puts them into the gains frame. There is, 
34 Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 10. 
35 Jeffrey D. Berejikian, “A cognitive theory of deterrence,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 2 
(2002): 166. 
36 Jack Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” Political Psychology, Vol. 13, no. 2, Special 
Issue (1992), 171. 
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however, more to this problem than meets the eye. Visiting the descriptive foundations of 
the theory can help unravel the complexities. 
a. The Reference Point 
“People think in terms of gains and losses, and encode choices in terms of 
deviations from a reference point.”37 In terms of international order, it implies states may 
either feel satisfied with a strategic equation vis their credibility, or they may view the 
existing order as somehow impinging on their reputation and credibility, in which case, 
the continuation of such order is encoded as a loss, tempting them to endeavor to reverse 
or alter it. 
b. The Reflection Effect 
“People treat gains differently than losses: they tend to be risk-averse with respect 
to gains and risk-acceptant with respect to losses.”38 This is one of the most interesting 
anchors of Prospect Theory. Since “reputation affects future utilities, and future losses 
hurt more than future gains gratify,”39 and reputation for irresoluteness is perceived to 
invite, or at least encourage, future depredation by revisionist states, leaders and policy 
makers factor reputation for resoluteness as a central component into their security 
strategies. Thus, “although states generally are more willing to defend high-value items in 
crisis situations, low-value items might also be worth defending if doing so would bolster 
one’s reputation and deter future threats.”40 This is quite natural, as “fear is usually a 
more potent motivator than the desire for expansion.”41 The reflection effect will thus 
motivate states to be risk-acceptant while investing in reputation in order to avoid future 
losses. 
37 Ibid., 174. 
38 Levy, “An introduction to prospect theory,” 174. 
39 Jack S. Levy, “Prospect theory and international relations: Theoretical applications and analytical 
problems,” Political Psychology (1992), 285. 
40 Sechser, “Coercive Threats and Reputation-Building in International Crises,” 5. 
41 Jervis, “Political implications of loss aversion,” 194. 
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c. Loss Aversion 
“Losses loom larger than gains.”42 Thus, Jimmy Conner’s exclamation that “I 
hate to lose more than I like to win”43 about summarizes this phenomenon. Loss aversion 
generates some powerful effects. One such effect is the endowment effect: It is the “over-
evaluation of current possessions that determines how people value what they have more 
than “comparable” things they do not have.”44 This generally leads states to value what 
they are asked to concede more than what they are offered in return, causing concession 
aversion. The removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey appeared to the U.S. leaders to 
count more significantly than the negotiated exchange for the removal of Russian 
missiles from Cuba; hence, the administration demurred at making the former public. 
States would thus invest in a reputation for resolve as a powerful tool, essentially to 
minimize the prospects of concessions in any future bargaining. Another interesting 
prediction of the Prospect Theory is it “leads us to expect people to persevere in losing 
ventures much longer than standard rationality would lead one to expect.”45 Thus, “sunk 
costs…loom large in the secret deliberations.”46 This effect powers the tendency among 
states that once back down to be much more firm the next time around, even if the 
interests involved are trivial. It also motivates actors, in order to recoup or regain a recent 
loss, to invest against the possibility of losing again, or to reinforce failure. Progressive 
escalation and expansion of operations in Vietnam and Afghanistan by the USSR bear 
testimony to this effect. 
Another compelling product of loss aversion is the domino effect, or the chain 
reaction. It is the belief of decision makers that small losses, in terms of reputation and 
credibility, multiply via the domino effect, while gains are not expected to have such 
consequences.47 Thus, 
42 Levy, “An introduction to prospect theory,” 175. 
43 Quoted in Jack Levy, “An introduction to prospect theory,” Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2, 
Special Issue (1992), 175. 
44 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 175. 
45 Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” 190. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., 188. 
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a rational statesman would not be willing to run the risk in order to secure 
a moderate gain, but would accept much higher risks to avoid a short-run 
loss of the same magnitude because it would lead to greater losses over a 
longer period of time.48  
West Berlin had no intrinsic value for the West. The U.S. response to the Soviet 
ultimatum was as such influenced by the fear of losing face and falling dominoes. 
Johnson succinctly expressed the fear that, “surrender anywhere threatens defeat every 
where.”49 Eisenhower evinced the same fear in his letter to British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill, when he stated that, “there comes a point where constantly giving in 
only encourages further belligerence.”50 The British response to the Argentinian 
adventure in the Falklands was driven by concern for falling dominoes, manifested in a 
senior British defense official’s comments, “If we cannot get the Argentinians out of the 
Falklands, how long do you think it will be before the Spaniards take a crack at 
Gibraltar?”51 
d. The Framing 
“Because of the encoding of outcomes in terms of a reference point and the 
differential treatment of gains and losses, identification of the reference point becomes 
critical.”52 The identification is not only critical, but also extremely complex. Usually 
status quo is viewed as the reference point. Conventionally, when a distinction between 
the defender and challenger of the status is clear, deterrence is effective as the challenger 
is seeking gains. However, “if the other [challenger] is driven by fear of losses, threats 
and coercion are likely to backfire, producing a spiral of greater hostility.”53 The effect is 
the security dilemma. Under such circumstances both of the antagonists believe they are 
defending the status quo and tend to view themselves in the losses frame; the chances of 
48 Ibid., 189. 
49 Quoted in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 211. 
50 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957 (Washington, 1986), 
2:294. 
51 Quoted in Richard Ned Lebow, “Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origin of the Falklands 
War,” Psychology and Deterrence, 117. 
52 Levy, “An introduction to prospect theory,” 178. 
53 Ibid. 
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the deterrence failing thus become increasingly real: “Conflicts and wars are more likely 
when each side believes it is defending the status quo.”54 Thus, when the contenders are 
satisfied with the status quo, “states seem to make greater efforts to preserve the status 
quo against a threatened loss than to improve their position by a comparable amount.”55 
The status quo itself is problematic in the abstract realm of reputation and 
credibility. Levy believes that the initial threat of military action in itself changes the 
status quo in terms of utilities because of the reputational and, perhaps, domestic political 
costs involved, putting a challenger into a retreat from status quo which induces more 
risk-seeking behavior, as opposed to a retreat to status quo.56 On the other hand, the 
defender, as the endowment effect predicts, will not be able to come to terms with the 
new status quo—a fait accompli—hence, he is more likely to be risk-acceptant to revive 
the old status quo, challenging to alter the new one in the process. The issue becomes 
even more complex when a challenger state sets its aspiration level as the reference point. 
The Russian policy towards Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 can be explained in 
terms of Russia setting its aspiration level—restoring the glory of the Soviet—as the 
reference point. 
While most of the effects discussed above tend to encourage states to develop 
strong deterrent reputations against future challenges that are likely to push them into a 
losses frame, the reference point is peculiarly troublesome with regards to compellent 
reputations. Faits accomplis and threats aimed at compellence may potentially set a new 
status quo, a new reference point for the challenger, and the prospect of retreat to the old 
status quo consequently may push the revisionist state into the losses frame. The equation 
becomes more acute with the endowment effect, wherein the defender takes a long time 
to reconcile to the new status quo and remains in the losses frame longer, while the 
revisionist state quickly accommodates the fait accompli, views it as the new reference 
point, and a backwards deviation potentially pushes him into the losses frame. In such 
54 Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” 192. 
55 Levy, “Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical 
Problems,” 284. 
56 Jack S. Levy, “Quantitative studies of deterrence success and failure,” Perspectives on deterrence 
(1989), 126–27. 
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particular circumstances, both the defender and the challenger tend to fight for the status 
quo: the defender for the old status quo, while the challenger for the new one. 
Thus, far we provided the introduction to the thesis and built a theoretical 
framework for the research questions. Next we shall discuss how the obsession of 




II. THE CULT OF REPUTATION—A CAUSE OF CRISIS 
A. THE CULT OF REPUTATION 
While scholars debate how much reputations matter in international relations, and 
whether these matter at all, leaders and policy makers overwhelmingly subscribe to the 
broad version of reputation hypothesis. They believe that people “support conflict today 
in order to avoid conflict tomorrow,”57 as “it is easier to stop a snowball before it begins 
to roll downhill than to intervene after it has started to gain momentum.”58 Consequently, 
“contrary to the utilitarian theories of war for security (homo politicus), or war for profit 
(homo economicus), … state leaders also seek to cultivate a certain image of themselves 
and their collectivity (homo symbolicus).”59 The difference between reputation (what 
others think of you) and self-image (what you think others think of you) appears to be lost 
on decision makers. They assume others—adversaries and allies alike—to be thinking 
precisely what they themselves think, effectively confusing in the process reputation with 
self-image. 
Another source of this cult of reputation is leaders’ misplaced belief that 
bargaining a reputation acquired through one crisis can translate into behavioral 
reputation for potential future crises. Leaders, thus, not only attempt to be resolute 
because their states’ vital interests are at stake; they often view reputation for resolve 
itself as a vital interest.60 For reasons of domestic audience costs, the cult is more 
pervasive in democracies. American foreign policy makers believe that “…actors around 
the world stage, both friendly and unfriendly, invariably draw inferences about America’s 
strength, determination, and reliability—and thus its likely future behavior—from the 
broad range of its foreign policy decisions.”61 Thus, according to Kennedy, the U.S. 
57 Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 1. 
58 Copeland, “Do Reputations Matter?,” 43. 
59 Thomas Lindemann, Causes of war: The struggle for recognition, ECPR Press, 2011, 85. 
60 Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 15. 
61 McMahon, “Credibility and world power: Exploring the psychological dimension in postwar 
American diplomacy,” 455. 
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actions during Vietnam War would be “examined on both sides of the Iron Curtain … as 
a measure of the administration’s intentions and determination.”62 Such concerns have 
pushed great powers to war over areas of marginal national interest. 
B. REPUTATIONAL CONCERNS—A CAUSE OF CRISIS 
The cult of reputation is pervasive among policy-makers, especially those of great 
powers. A cursory study of the post-World War II major crises and conflict demonstrates 
how repeatedly leaders explained or justified initiatiation or continuation of conflicts in 
terms of building or preserving their credibility and reputation. 
1. The Cold War Period 
From post-World War II until 1991, international order revolved around two 
powers: the USSR and the U.S. Besides other features, the system rested on two 
competing ideologies; and ideological competition pushes issues of reputation and image 
to the fore.63 While it is hard to measure the Soviet concern for reputation due to the 
closed nature of their decision-making process, the U.S. strategists construed the 
communist prodding actions as an attempt at building a risk-acceptant reputation. In 
1950s, National Security Council Paper 68 warned that the Soviet Union wanted to 
“demonstrate that force, and the will to use it, are on the side of the Kremlin, [and] that 
those who lacked it are decadent and doomed.”64 Secretary Dulles feared that, if left 
uncontested, this would have grim implications for the Western alliance: “if our conduct 
indicates a continuing disposition to fall back and allow doubtful areas to fall under 
Soviet Communist control, then many nations will feel confirmed in the impression … 
that we do not expect to stand firm short of the North Atlantic area.”65 
62 Quoted in George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States And Vietnam, 1950–1975, 
2nd rev. ed. (New York, 1986), 83. 
63 McMahon, “Credibility and world power: Exploring the psychological dimension in postwar 
American diplomacy,” 470. 
64 Ibid., 92. 
65 Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar National 
Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 103. 
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Concern for reputation during the Cold War was particularly conspicuous in 
Washington where the policy makers believed that “in an inherently dangerous and 
unstable world…peace and order depend to a greater extent on Washington’s ability to 
convince adversaries and allies alike of its firmness, determination, and dependability.”66 
The obvious consequences were that crises “occurred with greatest frequency in areas of 
demonstrably marginal value to the core U.S. economic and security interests; 
and…American officials have often evinced as much concern for generalized perceptions 
of power, reputation, and prestige as they have with the preservation of more tangible 
interests.”67 
West Berlin had no intrinsic value in and of itself, and the loss of Berlin would 
not have complicated Western Europe’s defense in any significant way. However, 
“American policy makers were faced with the problem of making both communist 
adversaries and Western allies believe that the U.S. would live up to its promises in 
defending disparate and far-flung allies, even to the point of initiating a nuclear 
conflagration.”68 Berlin became a symbol of the willingness of the U.S. to come to the 
defense of the Western European allies.69 
The Cuban Missile Crisis is another instance where the world was brought to the 
brink of nuclear holocaust out of concerns for “optics.” President Kennedy later admitted 
that Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba would not have significantly altered the nuclear 
balance between the United States and the Soviet Union; however, he added, “it would 
have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality.”70 
66 McMahon, “Credibility and world power: Exploring the psychological dimension in postwar 
American diplomacy,” 455. 
67 Ibid., 458. 
68 Jason C. Sharman, “Rationalist and constructivist perspectives on reputation,” Political Studies 55, 
no. 1 (2007), 22. 
69 Copeland, “Do reputations matter?,” 41. 
70 Quoted in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 213. 
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The U.S. was physically drawn into the Korean War in 1950, apparently out of 
reputational concerns.71 “The decision to intervene…was the product not of a 
reassessment of the Korean peninsula’s intrinsic importance to the U.S., but of its 
symbolic relevance, especially in view of the lessons friends and foes alike might draw 
from Washington’s response to what U.S. diplomats, reflexively interpreted as a test of 
American resolve.”72 A State Department’s intelligence estimate underlining that Soviet 
success in Korea “will cause significant damage to U.S. prestige in Western Europe”73 
supported this assessment. 
Thucydides had famously pronounced that nations go to war out of “fear, honor, 
or interest.”74 Honor, or “the desire for prestige, still persists in a modified form in that 
there are still superpowers that are concerned with a reputation of firmness.”75 Vietnam 
represents this concern in the starkest form: “American leaders explained, justified, and 
defended the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam so frequently in terms of the need to 
prove U.S. credibility that their statements resemble ritualistic incantations.”76 
Successive presidents raised the stakes in Vietnam as demonstration of their resolve, 
which “… intended to deter Soviet aggression in Western Europe.”77 The rationale 
presented to Secretary of Defense McNamara for committing troops to Vietnam in 1965 
is instructive: 
• 70 percent—To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as 
guarantor). 
• 20 percent—To keep SVN [South Vietnam] (and adjacent) territory from 
Chinese hands.  
71 William Whitney Stueck, The road to confrontation: American policy toward China and Korea, 
1947–1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 7–8, 75, 174, 186, 231. 
72 McMahon, “Credibility and world power: Exploring the psychological dimension in postwar 
American diplomacy,” 459. 
73 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 (Washington, 1976), 7:154.  
74 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, New York: E. P. Dutton, Book 1, Chapter 76, Section 2. 
75 Lindemann, Causes of war, 3–4. 
76 McMahon, “Credibility and world power: Exploring the psychological dimension in postwar 
American diplomacy,” 466. 
77 Lindemann, Causes of war, 75. 
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• 10 percent—To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of 
life.78 
Even as the mounting casualties and increased domestic pressure rendered 
continued U.S. engagement in the conflict prohibitively costly, decision makers were 
haunted by the potential reputational repercussions of a sudden disengagement. Kissinger 
thus voiced his woes at the prospects of any abrupt withdrawal from Vietnam: “Scores of 
countries and millions of people relied for their security on our willingness to stand by 
allies…. No serious policymaker could allow himself to succumb to the fashionable 
debunking of ‘prestige,’ ‘or ‘honor,’ or ‘credibility.’”79 
Later, President Reagan invoked the same credibility logic in 1983 for 
intervention in Grenada: “if we cannot defend ourselves [in Central America], then we 
cannot expect to prevail elsewhere…. Our credibility will collapse and our alliances will 
crumble.”80 
2. The Post-Cold War Period 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union on December 26, 1991, the U.S. emerged as 
the unchallenged superpower. Such a status carries its associated demands—the principal 
one being ensuring at least some semblance of world stability. Saddam’s invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 was thus a test of the U.S. resolve to establish itself as a world stabilizer. 
Former U.S. President Richard Nixon thus stressed, “if we fail to roll back [Saddam’s] 
aggression—peacefully if possible, by force if necessary—no potential aggressor in the 
future will be deterred by warnings from the U.S. or by U.N. resolutions.”81 At the time 
of the invasion, President George H. W. Bush declared that dislodging Saddam from 
Kuwait would reinforce the U.S.’s credibility: “when we prevail, there will be a renewed 
credibility for the United States.”82 
78 Quoted in R. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 154. 
79 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, 1979), 228. 
80 New York Times, April 28, 1983. 
81 Quoted in William Safire column, New York Times, December 14, 1990. 
82 New York Times, February 10, 1991. 
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Reputational concerns were in large part instrumental in the Second Gulf War. 
The U.S. government’s official policy of regime change in Iraq was sanctified in the Iraq 
Liberation Act of 1998. By the end of December 2002, the U.S. had deployed some 
20,000 troops on the Iraqi border, and even if the regime change was preferred through 
coercion, when President Bush asked his National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, 
whether it was necessary to engage in war, “she insisted on the fact that the United States 
was engaged in coercive diplomacy and the president should carry out his threat to 
remain credible.”83 It was not possible to recall the troops without losing reputation. 
Reputational concerns again gripped U.S. policy makers even after the overthrow of the 
Saddam regime. Without achieving the objective of a stable democracy in the country, it 
was feared, a quick exit from Iraq would be a major blow to U.S. credibility and 
reputation, with serious consequences for its war on terror. President Bush repeatedly 
noted that, “extremists of all strains would be emboldened by the knowledge that they 
forced America to retreat.”84 Brent Scowcroft, the former National Security Advisor of 
President George H.W. Bush, saw a premature U.S. withdrawal from Iraq as creating “the 
perception, worldwide…that the American colossus had stumbled, was losing its resolve, 
and could no longer be considered a reliable ally or friend—or the guarantor of peace and 
stability in this critical region.”85 
Great power status generates innate hubristic sensitivities, which potentially 
engender a resort to use force: “far from being an international relations epiphenomenon, 
non-recognition, as defined by attacks (real or imaginary) on an actor’s self-image, can 
have very real effects on the fuelling and legitimizing of physical violence.”86 The 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the twin towers and Pentagon were  the first 
attacks on the U.S. homeland after Pearl Harbor. The psychological effects on the 
83 Lindemann, Causes of war, 109. 
84 President Bush Addresses the 89th Annual National Convention of the American Legion, August 
28, 2007, Reno, Nevada, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/08/20070828-2.html  
85 Brent Scowcroft, “Getting the Middle East Back on Our Side,” New York Times, January 4, 2007. 
Hakan Tunç separately argued that “For those who oppose a rapid U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, including 
members of the Bush administration, however, among the most feared consequences is damage to 
America’s reputation.” (Hakan Tunç, “Reputation and U.S. withdrawal from Iraq,” Orbis 52, no. 4 (2008), 
1–2.) 
86 Lindemann, Causes of war, 3. 
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American public and leadership were enormous, and the response was both quick and 
intense. According to Lindemann, “The quest for recognition can be the determinant 
factor in armed confrontation, above all when ‘narcissistic wounds’ [injury to one’s 
dignity, or self-image] (such as the destruction of the World Trade Centre on September 
11) are associated with hubristic self-images (inflated self-description).”87 The U.S. 
spurned the Taliban’s offer of surrendering Osama bin Laden to a third country if the 
U.S. shared evidence of his involvement in the attacks.88 On October 14, President Bush 
rejected another Taliban offer to give bin Laden to a neutral third country by adding, 
“[T]here is no negotiation, period.”89 This stern position was the outcome of, in addition 
the loss of precious lives, the narcissist injuries the sole superpower had suffered. 
Symbolic motivations were in large part at play in the outbreak of war and did not permit 
diplomacy to run its course, and Just War Theorists believe the jus ad bellum criterion of 
last resort was not met in case of Afghanistan.90 
Using these theories, in the next chapter we will take a single a case study to 
explain Russian policies in the near abroad, with special reference to Georgia, employed 
as a means by which Russia could regain the reputation it lost with the collapse of the 
USSR. Specifically our examination will address whether Russia deliberately initiated 
war against Georgia as a costly signal to Ukraine and the West, and if that action was 
“closely connected to subsequent dispute initiation and that the effects of reputation 
generalize beyond the immediate circumstances of the past dispute.”91 We will draw 
some conclusions whether the violence in this case could have been curtailed were the 
factor of reputation taken out of the strategic calculus. 
87 Ibid., 5. 
88 On September 21, 2001, the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef, said, “Our 
position on this is that if America has proof, we are ready for the trial of Osama bin Laden in light of the 
evidence.” Helen Kennedy, Taliban balks, won’t hand over bin Laden: Demands proof he was involved. 
New York Daily News, September 22, 2001. 
89 Quoted in Elisabeth Bumiller,. 2001. President rejects offer by Taliban for negotiations: Demands 
surrender of bin Laden—U.S. bombs fall in Kabul. New York Times, October 15, 2001. 
90 Neta C. Crawford, “Just war theory and the U.S. counterterror war,” Perspective on Politics 1, no. 
01 (2003), 15. 
91 Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo. “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in 
International Politics,” Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 1 (2011): 101–113. 
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As a single case study, by no means, does this thesis prove or disprove any theory. 




III. THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR, AUGUST 2008 
A. INTRODUCTION 
But, there is also the more serious kind of “face,” the kind that in modern 
jargon is known as a country’s “image,” consisting of other countries’ 
beliefs (their leaders’ beliefs) about how the country can be expected to 
behave. It relates not to a country’s “worth” or “status” or even “honor,” 
but to its reputation for action  
–Thomas C. Schelling 
The purpose of this study is to explore, through the conceptual lenses of the 
Prospect Theory, the first action, taken by Russia in its quest to restore its lost reputation 
on the international arena. Besides power and security, there are other factors driving a 
state-actor to certain behaviors and certain actions. For Russia, these other factors are 
namely its prestige and its reputation. As discussed earlier, reputation is defined as 
someone’s identity (words and actions), seen by the others, and reflected through their 
opinions, attitudes, behaviors, and actions toward the very same person. Those others 
include allies, enemies, and neutrals – three different categories. Each one of these 
categories - ally enemy or neutral - may develop actions toward an individual based on an 
assessment of his reputation. At the same time, the individual estimates his reputation by 
attempting to see himself through the eyes of the three different categories previously 
mentioned. For Russia, reputation rests upon what Moscow perceives of its ties with the 
rest of the world, specifically the West and the United States.     
We argue the war against Georgia was the indispensable condition by which 
Russia challenged the status quo of western dominance, regardless the potential risk. If 
Russia retreated once again, it could likely reach a point of no return on the geopolitical 
stage; therefore, although Russia was aware of the U.S. and Western support for Georgia, 
and Russia’s risk acceptance was very high, as determined by 17-year losing period on 
the global stage. At the same time, the West was not willing to go to war against a 
desperate and wounded, but nuclear armed Russia. The fact that Russia did not retreat as 
usual broke the expectations of the West.  
 25 
We will offer a retrospective analysis of the events that caused Russia’s loss of 
prestige; moreover, we will focus on the geopolitical factors and conditions that forced 
Russia to react militarily against Georgia.  
Jeremy Kotkin, a U.S. Army strategist, argues, “yet without understanding Russian 
psyche and perceptions, the stream of history both recent and further afield, and finally, 
how the system of geopolitics is never linear and unitary, we will automatically be drawn 
into handling the situation poorly.”92 As Kotkin further argues, empathy is “the 
experience of understanding another person’s condition from their perspective.”93 
Therefore, with empathy, we will explore the events through the lenses of Russia’s 
policymakers, Russian mentality, and psychology.   
With the end of the Cold War in 1989, followed by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, the grand chessboard of nations underwent a total transfiguration. Instead 
of two major geopolitical players, there remained only one. Many were convinced this 
was the end of the Soviet versus Western ideological, political, and military rivalry 
worldwide.  
Former General Secretary of the Soviet Union Mikhail S. Gorbachev later would 
say, “in the West, the breakup of the Soviet Union was viewed as a total victory . . . 
Western leaders were convinced that they were at the helm of the right system and of a 
well-functioning, almost perfect economic model. Scholars opined that history had 
ended.”94 
It was the American political scientist, Francis Fukuyama, who proclaimed the 
“end of history” in the “realm of ideas,” implying the better political and social system, 
had proven victorious after the end of the Cold War. According to Fukuyama, the “end of 
history” was an end of sociocultural evolution, whereupon Western liberal democracy 
became the paramount achievement and the final form of development of human 
government; it was seen by him as the system that would “govern the material world in 
92 Jeremy Kotkin, “Crimea: Russia is harvesting the seeds sown in the 1990s,” Medium, March 3, 
2014. 
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the long run.”95 What is interesting, and often neglected, is the fact that Fukuyama wrote 
his essay, The End of History in 1989, two full years before the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. His book, The End of History and the Last Man, was published in 1992. This led 
many to perceive the “the end of history” as a victory over the Soviet Union because of 
the end of the Cold War.  
A few years later, Samuel Huntington opposed the end-of-history concept 
presented by his student Fukuyama. In his article, “The Clash of Civilizations,” 
developed in 1993, the author argued that nation-states would remain the major actors on 
the international arena; however, the conflicts would be between nations which belong to 
different civilizations. “The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the 
future.”96 Civilization is a cultural entity. The ideological division would be replaced 
with cultural one. The main parties in the post-Cold War conflicts would be Western 
Christianity or Western Civilization on one side, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on 
the other.97 Huntington proved his hypothesis through the religious/ethnic and culturally-
based armed conflicts which were to happen in former Yugoslavia, and in the post-Soviet 
space.  
Today, Fukuyama’s view is rejected; he failed to recognize the U.S. realpolitik, 
power politics as doctrine in international relations, which became more unambiguous, 
especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the last three decades of the 
Cold War, both superpowers deterred each other because of the retaliatory nuclear strike 
capabilities they possessed. With the economic and military decline of Russia, however, 
the United States stopped taking into consideration Russia’s position on major 
international matters, such as the NATO proliferation and the war against Serbia, 
followed by U.S. recognition of Kosovo’s independence, the war waged against Iraq 
without U.N Security Council approval, the U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, “which Moscow regarded as the linchpin of its nuclear 
95 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest (Summer 1989). 
96 Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993. 
97 Ibid.  
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security,”98 as well as the U.S. overt involvement in the “color revolutions” in the former 
Soviet republics of Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan,99 followed by the support for 
Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO. All of these, as the last U.S. Ambassador in the 
Soviet Union, Jack F. Matlock Jr., said, constituted a “diplomatic equivalent of swift 
kicks to the groin.”100 All these steps mentioned above created the preconditions for the 
United States-Russia relations to reach the lowest point since the 1962 Cuba Missile 
Crisis during the Ukrainian crisis several years later.   
In his memoirs, former United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates would 
later admit that  
[D]uring the Cold War, to avoid military conflict between us, we had to 
take Soviet interests into account, maneuvering carefully wherever those 
interests were affected. When Russia was weak in the 1990s and beyond, 
we did not take Russian interests seriously. We did a poor job of seeing 
the world from their point of view, and of managing the relationship for 
the long term.101 
During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union supported 
authoritarian regimes, regardless of the violations of human rights committed by those 
regimes. This support reflects the concept of the realpolitik: when material considerations 
take priority over ideological and ethical premises. After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the U.S. continued to exploit the same modus operandi worldwide, led by its 
national interest, and definitely not by its ideals. As a result, “American military and 
diplomatic policies have convinced a large part of Russia’s political class (and 
intelligentsia) that Washington’s intentions are aggressive, aggrandizing, and 
deceitful.”102 The U.S. policy created in Russia—as a state actor and as a society—the 
perception of humiliation which Russia and its people suffered: the Russians could not 
98 Stephen F. Cohen, “America’s Failed (Bi-Partisan) Russia Policy,” The World Post, February 28, 
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tolerate any humiliation once they felt strong enough to oppose it. The 2008 Russia–
Georgia war was their first opposition to the status quo. 
The first illustration of disrespecting Russia was the broken promise given by the 
U.S. to the U.S.S.R. that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would not 
expand eastward. How did that broken promise look from the Russian perspective? We 
answer this question by posing three rhetorical questions: Why did NATO expand? If the 
Alliance was not against Russia, why was Moscow not invited to join NATO? If it was 
not against Russia, then, why did the U.S. refuse to work with Russia toward creating a 
mutual Antiballistic missile defense system? These three basic questions became the 
Apple of Discord between the Russian Federation on one side, and the United States of 
America and its allies on the other., 103104   
The promise was broken when Russia was seen as weak and incapable of resisting 
and reacting. Following almost a decade of continuous decline of its predominantly 
economic and military power, Russia stepped down from the international stage and 
stopped playing a major role. Consequently, Russia’s reputation and credibility 
diminished and even disappeared before the Western powers, and especially, the United 
States. 
There were multiple, connected, and often complex reasons forcing Russia to 
withdraw from the stage: beginning with the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a 
period between 1991–2000 when Russia’s disintegration continued and its existence as a 
state was questioned. Then, at the very end of 1999, Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin 
announced that he would transfer his authority to Vladimir V. Putin. On May 7, 2000, 
elections for President were held in Russia. The newly elected President became 
Vladimir Putin, who remained in the office until May 7, 2008, or exactly three months 
before the Russia–Georgia war. 
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Assuming power, Putin initiated large-scale measures to stop the internal 
disintegration process and to further stabilize the country, especially in North Caucasus 
where after decisive actions, Chechnya was reintegrated. The 2000–2008 rapid growth of 
both the economy and military power led internally to increased trust and hope among the 
Russians toward Moscow. Once the nation stabilized, the Kremlin focused on regaining 
Russia’s global status as a major power. Such status would be first claimed in 2007, 
during the Munich Security Conference, where President Putin was invited to give a 
speech. Since that speech is relevant, it will be analyzed later on. In his speech, Putin 
expressed Russia’s dissatisfaction with the world order, established after the end of the 
Cold War. The speech had an impact “like an ice-cold shower”105 on the West. Putin sent 
strong and clear signal to the West. Whether these signals were interpreted in the way, 
Russia expected, though, is debatable.   
The 2008 Russo-Georgian War became an exchange of the lack of mutual 
understanding between Russia and the West. Georgia became the arena of the first clash 
between Russia and the United States, or the first proxy war after the end of the Cold 
War. The causes for this conflict go far beyond 2008 Russia–Georgia War: it was just the 
first episode of the new Russia-U.S. rivalry. The next episodes would be the Syrian and 
the Ukrainian crises. All those should be scrutinized as a sequence of related events in the 
Russian-U.S. context, rather than as isolated conflicts. 
In 2008, the Kremlin refused to retreat. Russia possessed both the capability or 
the power to hurt—“to destroy things that somebody treasures, to inflict pain and 
grief,”106 and the will to use force—the necessary functions for achieving a successful 
coercion over Georgia. As discussed, “people think in terms of gains and losses, and 
encode choices in terms of deviations from a reference point.”107 In this case, “the risk-
acceptance with respect to losses”108 was the engine for Russia’s determination. Being in 
losing frames and not acting decisively, Russia would continue to lose. Therefore, unlike 
105 Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, 155. 
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107 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 174. 
108 Levy, “An introduction to prospect theory,” 174. 
 30 
                                                 
the previous years of multiple concessions, Moscow sent a clear response: will to act and 
risk-acceptance, which would later help Russia to build a reputation for strong resolve. 
Any reputation for irresoluteness would be perceived by the United States as a weakness, 
further encouraging the Western policy-makers to ignore and disrespect Russia.   
Although the war was very short and limited in scale, its geopolitical resonance 
was enormous: it was the first time when Russia directly claimed and defended its 
national interests after 17 years of acquiescence to western policy making. With this 
stunning victory, gained within only five days by conducting for first time a hybrid war 
against the U.S.-backed and militarized regime in Georgia, Russia demonstrated its 
capabilities to defend its national interests. The war became a strong signal to the world 
that Russia was resolved to regain its lost image. The quest for reputation began.  
Before delving into the Russia–Georgia War, we will examine what caused 
Russia, the successor of the one of the two superpowers, to lose her status. We will 
attempt to provide an answer to the following questions, What impacted Russian and 
Western attitudes after the collapse of the USSR? What episodes in the Russia-West 
relations contributed to the 2008 war? 
B. THE END OF THE COLD WAR 
I assured the President of the United States that I will never start a hot war 
against the USA. . . We are just at the very beginning of our road, long 
road to a long-lasting, peaceful period. [T]he USSR is prepared to cease 
considering the U.S. as an enemy and announce this openly. 
Mikhail Gorbachev  
We can realize a lasting peace and transform the East-West relationship to 
one of enduring co-operation. That is the future that Chairman Gorbachev 
and I began right here in Malta.  
George Bush 
The Malta Summit was held March 2 – 3, 1989, on the Soviet cruise ship Maxim 
Gorky, where the leaders of the two superpowers met and officially and symbolically 
declared the end of the Cold War. The 1989 Malta Summit was considered by many as 
the most important meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union since the 
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1945 Yalta Conference, when Joseph Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston 
Churchill decided the future fate of Europe after the end of the WWII.   
Gorbachev would reminisce later that both superpowers had gone through a 
difficult road in order to make multiple agreements on the elimination of intermediate 
and short-range missiles, and the reduction of the strategic nuclear missiles by 50 percent. 
The agreements they reached made possible it to announce before the world the end of 
the Cold War.109 
On December 26, 1991, two years after the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union 
ceased to exist. Several weeks later, in January 1992, Mikhail Gorbachev argued that, 
“the end of the Cold War is our common victory.”110 In 1992, in his State of the Union 
address, American President George H. W. Bush said, “by the grace of God, America 
won the Cold War.”111 These words determined the policymaking of all the future U.S. 
presidents toward Russia. Instead of improving its relations with Russia right after 1991, 
the U.S. claimed victory over the Soviet Union, adopting “an aggressive triumphalist 
approach to Moscow. That administration tried to dictate Russia’s post-Communist 
development and to turn it into a U.S. client state. It moved the U.S.-led military alliance, 
NATO, into Russia’s former security zone,”112 violating the strategic promises between 
both countries.  
Ironically, the Cold War ended two years earlier; therefore, President Bush’s 
premise about winning the Cold War against Russia was false. Imagine two judokas who 
have planned a bout for world title. Suddenly, one of them has suffered a car accident, 
causing multiple fractures. In this case, will the other judoka be considered the legitimate 
world champion after never actually fighting with his opponent?   
109 Mikhail Gorbachev, “Is the World Really Safer Without the Soviet Union?” The Nation, 
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Mikhail Gorbachev would later state that, “contrary to what is sometimes 
asserted, the Soviet Union was not destroyed by any foreign power, but as a result of 
internal developments.”113 In fact, the Soviet Union was destroyed from the inside, 
regardless of the referendum in March 1991, where the vast majority of the people 
expressed their will to remain integrated within the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the 
leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus made the decision to put an end to the Soviet 
Union. The U.S. strongly supported this decision, which “led to euphoria and a ‘winner’s 
complex’ amongst the American political elite.”114  
Jack Matlock, the last American Ambassador in the Soviet Union, shared the 
position of Gorbachev: “the common assumption that the West forced the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and thus won the Cold War is wrong. The fact is that the Cold War ended 
by negotiation to the advantage of both sides.”115 He also argues that, “a failure to 
appreciate how the Cold War ended has had a profound impact on Russian and Western 
attitudes—and helps explain what we are seeing now.”116 
The impact on the Russia-U.S. relations was enormous. Russia lost its trust 
toward the United States: according to polls conducted in 1991, 80 of the Russians had a 
positive attitude toward the U.S., while in 1999, almost the same percentage had a 
negative stance toward the United States.117 Since 1991, Russia has not been satisfied 
with the status quo; therefore, the 2008 Russo–Georgian War would become the first step 
made by Russia in opposing the world order imposed by the U.S. after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.  
Regardless of the promises given to Moscow, the NATO expansion, the NATO 
bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, happened 
because of the U.S.’s “winner’s complex.” Russia became sensitive to “the force’s 
113 Gorbachev, “Is the World Really Safer Without the Soviet Union?” 
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dominance”118 of the U.S. foreign policy, especially when NATO reached Russia’s 
borders. In this regard, in his speech at the 2014 Meeting of the Valdai International 
Discussion Club, President Putin claimed 
The Cold War ended, but it did not end with the signing of a peace treaty 
with clear and transparent agreements on respecting existing rules or 
creating new rules and standards. This created the impression that the so-
called “victors” in the Cold War had decided to pressure events and 
reshape the world to suit their own needs and interests.119 
The following sections are an illustration of the Western perception of being the 
winner over opponents who never fought and were never directly defeated. The focus 
will be on those episodes of Russia–West relations that created the preconditions and the 
motives for the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.   
C. BROKEN PROMISES OR HUMILIATING RUSSIA 
The roots of the confrontation between the United States and Russia derived from 
one broken promise and statement. On February 8, 1990, Secretary of State James A. Baker 
had a meeting with Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Soviet Union, 
during which they discussed the fate of reunited Germany.  
Secretary of State Baker said that if Germany were to remain part of NATO, 
“there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the 
east.”120  
Gorbachev made clear that “Any extension of the zone of NATO is 
unacceptable.”  
 “I agree,”121 Baker answered.  
The same promise was announced on May 17, 1990, when the seventh Secretary 
General of NATO, Manfred Hermann Wörner, gave a historical speech in the NATO 
118 President of Russia, “Speech and the Following Discussion.” 
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Headquarter in Brussels. In that speech, the Secretary General stated, “the very fact that 
we are ready not to deploy NATO troops beyond the territory of the Federal Republic, 
gives the Soviet Union firm security guarantees . . . We do not look upon the Soviet 
Union as the enemy. We want that nation to become our partner in ensuring security.”122  
Nevertheless, all those assurances had the purpose of simply deceiving the Soviet 
Union and making it withdraw its troops from its former satellites in Central and Eastern 
Europe. As previously mentioned, the U.S. would proclaim a victory123 over its enemy, 
which was otherwise called a “partner.” This would later be the main reason for Russia to 
lose trust in the West.  
In 1997, Zbigniew Brzezinski argued in The Grand Chessboard: “[A] failure to 
widen NATO . . . could even reignite currently dormant or dying Russian geopolitical 
aspirations in Central Europe.”124 Furthermore, it “could reawaken even more ambitious 
Russian desires.”125 All this reveals the real perception of the West toward Russia—as an 
adversary. Later, these words directed the U.S. foreign policy concerning NATO’s 
eastward expansion with the clear purpose of preventing Russia’s future ambitions for 
building a counterbalance to U.S. supremacy. Eventually, despite the promise, NATO 
expanded eastward, and in 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined the 
alliance.  
Initially, Moscow truly believed that the U.S. would not use the window of 
opportunity to expand NATO eastward because of Russia’s political, economic, and 
social weakness. The Soviet deputy foreign minister in 1990, and later Russia’s 
Ambassador to United Kingdom, Anatoly Adamishin, stated in 1997, “when we were 
told during the German reunification process that NATO would not expand, we believed 
it.”126 Also in 1997, Jack F. Matlock Jr. said, “when Gorbachev and others say that it is 
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their understanding NATO expansion would not happen, there is a basis for it.’’127 Later, 
Matlock would argue, 
We had no reason to expand the NATO military organization to the East 
until we had an agreement that would put Russia in a European defense 
structure.”128 While enlarging, NATO was trying to convince Russia that 
the Alliance was not a threat for Moscow. At the same time, NATO 
refused to invite Russia into the security architecture of Europe, especially 
after several direct hints by President Putin. In this regard, Matlock said: 
“I think it is unfortunate because I think there should have been a greater 
Western effort, American and West European, to make sure we had 
brought Russia into a security structure and that we have done more to 
encourage an understanding between the West Europeans and 
Russians.129  
The last Soviet leader, Gorbachev, expressed his disappointment in March 1999. 
The issue is not whether Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles join NATO. The 
problem is more serious: the rejection of the strategy for a new, common 
European system agreed to by myself and all the Western leaders, when 
we ended the Cold War . . . I feel betrayed by the West. The opportunity 
we seized on behalf of peace has been lost. The whole idea of a new world 
order has been completely abandoned.130  
Despite the broken promise with the first eastward enlargement of NATO, 
President Putin still hoped to build relations with both Western Europe and the United 
States, based on mutual respect. Following the 9/11 attack, the Russian President was the 
first Head of State to call and speak to President Bush.131 “On September 11, Putin did 
not hesitate to call his new friend, George W. Bush, to communicate his full support for 
the United States and the American people,”132 recollects the former United States 
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Ambassador to Russia and a former Senior Associate in Carnegie Endowment, Michael 
McFaul.  
“[W]e were the first country to support the American people back then, the first to 
react as friends and partners to the terrible tragedy of September 11,”133 President Putin 
would later state. Russia’s support for the United States in its war against terrorism was 
announced on September 24, 2001 in a five-point plan, pledging that Moscow “would (1) 
share intelligence with their American counterparts; (2) open Russian airspace for flights 
providing humanitarian assistance; (3) cooperate with Russia’s Central Asian allies to 
provide similar kinds of airspace access to American flights; (4) participate in 
international search and rescue efforts; and (5) increase direct assistance—humanitarian 
as well as military assistance—to the Northern Alliance and the Rabbani government in 
Afghanistan.”134 Later, Robert Gates would recall in his memoires that he, as “an old 
cold warrior” was surprised by the decision of Russia allowing nonlethal military 
equipment to Afghanistan to transit her territory.135 In addition, Putin sent a clear 
message to the U.S. that he did not consider Washington an enemy when he “voluntarily 
removed Russian bases from Cuba and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.”136  
During the Soviet war in Afghanistan (December 1979–February 1989), the 
Mujahedeen, or more precisely the Peshawar Seven insurgents, were trained and 
equipped by the U.S. and its allies.137 On October 7, 2001, the United States launched 
Operation Enduring Freedom. Sergey Ivanov, being Russia’s Minister of Defense at that 
time, argues that literally several days later, on the Tajikistan–Afghanistan border, 
representatives of the Taliban authorized by Mullah Mohammed Omar made contact with 
the Russian border troops, inviting Moscow to join and fight the “American danger.” The 
answer from the Russian Troops had been to “back off,”138 as Moscow was not looking 
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for revenge. It was a window of opportunity139 for the U.S. to build relations on mutual 
respect and cooperation with Russia, but instead, the United States kept treating Russia 
like a defeated enemy. 
If we analyze each one of these points, we will find out that Russia’s support for 
the U.S. in its war against terrorism in Afghanistan was significantly greater than that of 
the NATO members. After 9/11, Russia hoped to develop a strong partnership; moreover, 
Putin was convinced that Russia should align with the West. During his first visit to 
NATO Headquarter he asked George Robertson (tenth Secretary General of NATO) 
when NATO would invite Russia to become a member. Robertson answered Putin saying 
that Russia should apply for membership. Putin replied that Russia would not wait in a 
queue with other countries.  
It became clear to Putin that the West would not consider Russia an ally or a 
country with equal status.140 In 2012, being interviewed by German media, Putin would 
say, “It seems to me our partners do not want allies, they want vassals. They want to rule, 
but Russia does not work that way.”141 
Instead of building an alliance, or a strong partnership after 9/11, Washington’s 
“triumphalist reaction to the end of the Soviet state produced a winner-take-all diplomatic 
approach that has been almost as aggressive.”142 Therefore, it was not a surprise that the 
U.S. expressed its “gratitude” toward Russia’s significant support and assistance to the 
U.S. fighting the Taliban by further accepting new member into NATO, and by canceling 
in 2002 the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM)—a cornerstone of Russia’s nuclear 
security.143 Russia considers the missile defense as a direct threat to its security, arguing 
that such a missile defense would decrease the success of a nuclear retaliatory strike if 
Russia is attacked. Russia perceives the missiles defense as an element of the entire 
offensive system intended to be used against it. Certainly, the White House preferred to 
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view Russia’s interests abroad as less legitimate than America’s. As Zbigniew Brzezinski 
argued, “Russia is much too weak to be a partner.”144 
NATO’s expansion was accepted as a normal process, while Russia’s attempt to 
provide itself with security around its borders was viewed as imperialist ambitions. In 
fact, since 1991, all the major concessions were made only unilaterally by Moscow. At 
the same time, Washington had been violating Russia’s political sovereignty through so-
called “democracy-promotion,” which was simply an instrument for influencing the 
former Soviet populations in favor of the United States.145  
The attitude of the West towards Russia was encouraged by three major episodes 
of humiliation for Russia, which caused its loss of reputation: the First Chechen war 
(1994-1996), the falsified presidential elections in 1996, and the NATO operation against 
Yugoslavia in 1999.   
The First Chechen war was seen as the beginning of the process of disintegration 
of Russia; moreover, it was mostly not a military loss, but a political loss, which came 
after huge pressure from the West. It was the first significant loss of reputation for 
Russia, both internationally and domestically. Russia blamed the U.S. for supporting the 
terrorists in Chechnya, and the accusations would be repeated personally by President 
Putin.  
They [the United States] once sponsored Islamic extremist movements to 
fight the Soviet Union. Those groups got their battle experience in 
Afghanistan, and later gave birth to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The West if 
not supported, at least closed its eyes, and, I would say, gave information, 
and political and financial support to the international terrorists’ invasion 
of Russia (we have not forgotten this), and to the Central Asian 
countries.146 
With the falsified reelection of Yeltsin, the economic and political situation of 
Russia further deteriorated: “the U.S.-backed oligarchs stripped Russia’s industrial assets, 
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with the effect that the corruption scheme cut national output nearly in half causing 
depression and starvation.”147 
NATO’s intervention against Serbia was the third and most significant strike 
against Russia’s reputation. In his memoires, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert 
Gates, would admit that there had been an historical tie between both countries, largely 
ignored by the United States.148 Serbia is an Orthodox country. Since 1453, when 
Constantinople was conquered, Russia assumed the role of the protector of Orthodox 
Christians; therefore, it felt humiliated by the invasion of an Orthodox country having a 
centuries-long relationship with Russia.  
Certainly, the most tragic and degrading event for Russia was the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union, which was seen as a political, economic, and social catastrophe. In his 
2005 address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, President Putin would 
say, 
[W]e should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a 
major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it 
became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and 
compatriots found themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover, the 
epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself.149  
All the events mentioned above, along with the two waves of NATO’s expansion 
Eastward, were crucial in forming the foreign policy of President Putin and Russia. “He 
[Putin] is, above all, a Russian patriot who feels humiliated by the experience of the 
1990s, which were in the most formative period of his career,” Henry Kissinger 
argued.150 
Russia was not given the opportunity to become part of the European family and 
put into practice the concept Gorbachev had for a new and peaceful Europe. Since 
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Russia’s interests in its traditional sphere of influence (the so called near abroad) had 
been disrespected and ignored by the West, Russia perceived itself jeopardized by 
NATO. 
1. Further Deterioration of Russia-United States Relations  
Russia’s resolve to intervene in Georgia was triggered by external factors and 
events. On March 29, 2004, as part of the fifth enlargement of NATO, seven more 
Eastern European countries—former Soviet allies—joined NATO: Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The first three (the Baltic States) 
were former Soviet republics. Russia considered it a backstab. Russia had to make 
another concession and to admit the fact that NATO had become its neighbor. However, 
with the accession of the Baltic States into NATO, Russia perceived itself ignored again; 
its national security interests and area of traditional dominance for centuries were 
disrespected.  
The future catalyst for the Russia’s determination regarding Georgia appeared in 
2006, when the U.S. first announced that Georgia and Ukraine were seen as possible 
members of NATO. On November 28, 2006, in his Address to the participants of the 
Young Leaders Forum held in the Latvian capital Riga, the President of the United States 
George W. Bush, after expressing his support for Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania to join 
the Atlantic Alliance, added, “Georgia is seeking NATO membership as well. And as it 
continues on the path to reform, we will continue to support Georgia’s desire to become a 
NATO ally.”151 The statement made by President Bush sent a signal to Russia, and 
increased Russia’s national security concerns. This statement further deteriorated Russia–
United States relations.  
Calling the quick acceptance of former Soviet satellites countries into NATO a 
“mistake,”152 Robert Gates admitted that the agreement of deploying 5,000 U.S. troops in 
151 Address by the President of the United States George W. Bush to the participants of the Young 
Leaders Forum and of the Riga Conference. Riga NATO Summit 2006, November 28, 2014.  
152 Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, 157. 
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Bulgaria and Romania additionally eroded the U.S.–Russian relations;153 moreover, 
along with the 1972 ABM withdrawal, the attempts to bring Georgia and Ukraine into 
NATO, as well as the supported independence of Kosovo, “all had brought the bilateral 
relationship to the low point of Putin’s February 2007 tirade in Munich.”154   
2. Putin’s 2007 Speech at the Munich Security Conference 
Since 1962, the Munich Security Conference (MSC) in Munich, Germany has 
been an annual event on international security policy. During the 2007 MSC, there were 
270 political figures from 40 states. On behalf of the United States, there were the 
Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Robert M. 
Kimmitt, Senator John McCain, and Senator Joseph Lieberman. In addition, former 
Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, also represented the U.S. at the conference. 
Putin was the first Russian leader to participate at the conference. He delivered his 
speech on 10 February for only 15 minutes, but its international resonance was enormous. 
For first time Russia openly expressed its dissatisfaction with the status quo. A significant 
part of the speech was about U.S. supremacy, wherein Putin called the unipolar world 
“not only unacceptable but also impossible,” and accused it of causing more armed 
conflicts and casualties worldwide; moreover, he said, it “encourages a number of 
countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction.” Criticizing the Western “uncontained 
hyper use of force” as an instrument in international relations, Putin stated that, “first and 
foremost, the United States has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is 
visible in the economic, political, cultural, and educational policies it imposes on other 
nations.”155  
Putin stated that the anti-missile defense system in Europe could not make it more 
stable and secure, because it would provoke another arms race. He argued that the system 
was likely to be built against Russia, because neither North Korea nor Iran would be 
153 Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, 157. 
154 Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, 159. 
155 President of Russia, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security 
Policy,” February 10, 2007. 
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likely to have long-range missiles capable of hitting Western Europe. Putin accused the 
West of building “new dividing lines and walls between us,” after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. Putin said Russia was not against the will of any state to ensure its own security, 
but he posed the following question: Why had it been necessary for NATO to build 
military infrastructure right on the Russian border? Putin also criticized the exploitation 
of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe by a “group of countries” to 
“promote the foreign policy interests.”156 
President Putin expressed his discontentment with the West for frequently 
interfering with Russia’s internal affairs and teaching her democracy. “But for some 
reason, those who teach us do not want to learn themselves,” he said. In fact, Russian 
society, along with the growing wealth and welfare status, perceives such a “teaching” 
very offensive. In this regard, at the end of his speech, he stated that throughout the 
course of history, Russia “used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy. 
We are not going to change this tradition today.”157  
Because of the infamous 1991–1999 period in Russia, Moscow became very 
sensitive and suspicious toward Western activity in Russia. Putin did not miss the 
opportunity to make clear that, financed by foreign governments; NGOs were seen as, 
“an instrument that foreign states use to carry out their Russian policies.” He also stated 
that when elections were to be financed by foreign governments through NGOs, such 
financing would be considered an intervention in the Russia’s internal affairs: “Because, 
there is no democracy here, there is simply one state exerting influence on another.”158 
Certainly, the soft power policy that the U.S. implements in Russia is one of the major 
concerns of Russia today. 
Since the fate of Serbia has been of greater concern for Russia, Putin also touched 
upon that topic, especially on the background of the NATO/EU plans to recognize the 





                                                 
should decide their own destiny: “there is no need to play God and resolve all of these 
peoples’ problems.”159 In 2008, the precedent that the West created would be used by 
Russia in recognizing the breakaway territories from Georgia.  
In his memoirs, Robert Gates recalls that Putin “was clearly trying to drive a 
wedge between the Europeans and the United States with his anti-American remarks, but 
all the questions he was asked were hostile in tone and content. He had misread his 
audience.”160 Putin did read his audience; however, the audience misread Putin. Russian 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said he did not find Putin’s speech aggressive or 
confrontational, but “open, without hypocrisy and without the Cold War philosophy…. 
[O]ur relationships with the European Union and the United States and Germany are so 
mature that we can freely say what we truly think.”161 
The speech was interpreted as the beginning of a new Cold War. Senator Joseph I. 
Lieberman labeled the speech as “confrontational,” and that “some of the rhetoric takes 
us back to the cold war.”162 Senator John McCain said, “Moscow must understand that it 
cannot enjoy a genuine partnership with the West so long as its actions, at home and 
abroad, conflict fundamentally with the core values of the Euro-Atlantic 
democracies.”163 White House spokesman Gordon D. Johndroe stated, “We are surprised 
and disappointed with President Putin’s comments. His accusations are wrong.”164 
Others went further by posing the question, “So what are we to make of Putin’s 
intimidating broadsides in Munich?”165 NATO Secretary General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer 
described Putin’s speech as disappointing and not helpful.166 
159 Ibid. 
160 Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, 155 
161 Carl Schreck, “Putin Castigates U.S. Foreign Policy,” The Moscow Time. February 12, 2007. 
162 Thom Shanker and Mark Landler, “Putin Says U.S. Is Undermining Global Stability,” New York 
Times, February 11, 2007. 
163 Ibid.  
164 Ibid.  
165 Peter Brookes, “Putin’s Pique,” The Herritage Faundation, February 13, 2007. 
166 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the 
Munich Conference of Security Policy,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, February 9, 2007.  
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The reaction to Putin’s speech is an illustration of the Western attitude toward 
Russia: “What is permissible for Jove is not permissible for an ox.”167 In other words, 
Russia does not have the right to feel threatened when NATO military bases, personnel, 
and missiles have been installed on its borders, despite all the promises. However, when 
Russia initiates a large modernization of her armed forces, it becomes a great concern for 
the West. When Russia moves weaponry and troops within its borders, Russia is blamed 
for being aggressive and for threating Europe and NATO, even though NATO has 
expanded eastward, reaching Russia’s border, and depriving it of the buffer it needs to 
feel secured. Missiles or fighter jets deployed by the U.S. in foreign countries such as 
Poland, Czech Republic, Rumania, or the Baltic states, are acceptable, but missiles or 
fighter jets in the Russian exclave Kaliningrad, or close to the border, although still in 
Russia, are not acceptable, and are seen as an aggressive step. “We cannot agree with 
such an approach. The ox may not be allowed something, but the bear will not even 
bother to ask permission,”168 Putin would state in another speech delivered in 2014, 
which Washington somehow neglected, although the message to the U.S. and the West 
was even stronger.169 “We are ready to respect the interests of our partners, but we 
expect the same respect for our interests,”170 Putin would add.   
As Andrei Tsygankov argued, “since the end of the Cold War, many within the 
U.S. establishment have grown accustomed to meeting little resistance to their grand 
designs, and keeping Russia weak remains essential for extracting from Moscow 
important concessions on energy resources and political mastery in Eurasia.”171 When 
Russia expressed its disagreement with the status quo, and refused to be neglected, 
disrespected, and humiliated, it was criticized for being arrogant and aggressive. The 
western perception of ultimate and unchallenged superiority, however, obstructed the 
167 Quod licet Iovi, non licet bovi is a Latin phrase that indicated the existence of double standards. 
168 President of Russia, Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. 
169 Patrick L. Smith, “New York Times doesn’t want you to understand this Vladimir Putin speech,” 
Salon, November 6, 2014. 
170 President of Russia, Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club.  
171 Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Blaming Moscow: The Power of the Anti-Russia Lobby,” Global 
Dialogue, Volume 11, Winter/Spring 2009. 
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Western politicians to realize that despite their will, multiple non-Western countries with 
enormous potential had emerged, and Russia was among them. A year-and-a-half later, 
Russia put into practice Putin’s speech by defending its interests through military actions.  
Despite the negative resonance the speech received, Robert Gates later admitted,  
When I reported to the president my take on the Munich conference, I 
shared with him my belief that from 1993 onward, the West, and 
particularly the United States, had badly underestimated the magnitude of 
Russian humiliation in losing the Cold War and then in the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, which amounted to the end of the centuries-old Russian 
Empire. The arrogance, after the collapse, of American government 
officials, academicians, businessmen, and politicians in telling the 
Russians how to conduct their domestic and international affairs (not to 
mention the internal psychological impact of their precipitous fall from 
superpower status) had led to deep and long-term resentment and 
bitterness.172  
Certainly, the U.S. arrogance toward Russia has a logical explanation. In his 
essay, “Why International Primacy Matters,” published two years after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Samuel P. Huntington argued that the U.S. should sustain its global 
primacy, and preserve its influence over the rest of the world “in shaping global affairs,” 
because it “is central to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future of 
freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world.”173 This 
principle of the U.S. foreign policy was perceived by Russia as aggressive and dangerous 
to its existence. In 2007, Russia already felt strong enough to publicly express its opinion 
and to defend it; therefore, Putin’s speech was a quite natural reaction. State actors, just 
like people, when they become stronger/richer, do not tolerate any disrespect/ humiliation 
and their sensibility increases proportionally with their growing power or social/
international status; therefore, both Russia as a state and Russian society have anticipated 
an opportunity to demonstrate their determination to interrupt the ‘tradition’ of disrespect 
established in 1991.  
172 Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, 157. 
173 Samuel P. Huntington. “Why International Primacy Matters,” International Security, Vol. 17 No. 4 
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In 1997, Brzezinski stated that, “no Russian Ataturk is now in sight,”174 having in 
mind a real leader, capable of modernizing and integrating his state into the European 
family. Soon after that, this leader emerged. Ten years later, he publically insisted Russia 
deserved respect, unlike Ataturk; however, he remained misunderstood. It seemed the 
West was not ready to have a strong and sovereign Russia capable of defending its 
national interests.     
In an interview for Der Spriegel, one of Putin’s closest associates, Vladimir 
Yakunin, when asked what the West should do for its relations with Russia, answered, 
It should not humiliate us. You can throw a bucket of cold water on 
Russians, and we can take it. But, one should not humiliate us! The 
political scientist Hans Morgenthau said that countries should not forget 
the national interests of other countries when defining their own. The 
current American government becomes irritated over every attempt on the 
part of a country to go its own way—especially when it is as big and 
wealthy as Russia. That’s political arrogance.175  
The speech was another forward step by Putin forward in an attempt to restore 
Russia’s worldwide prestige since he came to power. It was a strong message that Russia 
will conduct its own independent foreign policy in accordance with its national interest.  
3. Bilateral Relationship Hitting the Bottom  
[W]e will not tolerate any more humiliation, and we are not joking. 
–Dmitri Medvedev 
On April 1, 2008, while in the Ukrainian capital Kiev, President George W. Bush 
once again expressed his support for both Georgia and Ukraine, in spite of strong 
opposition by Russia, by saying “helping Ukraine move toward NATO membership is in 
the interest of every member in the alliance and will help advance security and freedom 
in this region and around the world . . . There are no tradeoffs, period.”176 Nevertheless, 
174 Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, 120. 
175 “SPIEGEL Interview with Putin Confidant Vladimir Yakunin: ‘The West Shouldn’t Humiliate 
Us,’” Spiegel Online International, October 10, 2007. 
176 Bush Urges NATO Membership for Ukraine, Georgia, NPR, April 1, 2008. 
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Gates would later admit that the attempt to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO “was 
an especially monumental provocation,”177 while Russian Foreign minister Sergei 
Lavrov argued that inviting Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO, “would destroy bilateral 
relations between our two countries.”178 
On April 4, 2008, in Bucharest, President Putin made a press statement following 
a meeting of the Russia–NATO Council. It became clear that Russia would do everything 
necessary to stop the NATO expansion through Georgia or Ukraine. Putin said, “we view 
the appearance of a powerful military bloc on our borders . . . as a direct threat to the 
security of our country. The claim that this process is not directed against Russia will not 
suffice. National security is not based on promises.”179 This time, the Russian President 
was even more direct than usual. He sent a strong message not only to Georgia and 
Ukraine, but to the United States. The message was either misread, or it was understood 
correctly, but seen as lacking credibility. It was about the reputational deficiency that 
Russia experienced on the global arena. Russia, however, was already prepared to 
materialize its multiple signaling delivered through speeches and statements not taken 
seriously by the U.S.  
Russia would go to war with the clear intent of acquiring a reputation for resolve, 
which would provide it with the credibility it needed the next time its opponents sent a 
signal. As discussed, Russia was ready to go to war because it was more risk-acceptant to 
revive the old status quo it had during the time of the Soviet Union, and was under a 
challenge to revise the new one. Russia defined its aspiration levels as reference points 
that further motivated it to go to war. The meaning of the phrase “all politics is local,” 
was confirmed in the Caucasus, particularly in Georgia.  
To become a member of NATO, Georgia needed to solve its territorial issues with 
the breakaway regions, originating prior to the creation of the Soviet Union. Russia 
177 Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War,157. 
178 Ibid.,167. 
179 Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations in Geneva, “Press Statement 
and Answers of President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to Journalists’ Questions following a 
Meeting of the Russia–NATO Council (Bucharest, April 4, 2008).” 
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played the role of UN peacekeeper between the belligerents. For Tbilisi, it seemed that 
the territorial integrity of Georgia would only be solved through a military operation. 
After a long history of clashes between Georgia and the breakaway territories, it was 
highly unlikely to expect any reconciliation and peaceful solution of the situation. 
Georgia decided to act, but instead of forceful integrity, the military operation drew 
Russia into the conflict once Russian military personnel were killed by the Georgian 
forces.180 Russia was prepared for the war and was waiting, because the behavior of 
Saakashvili was very predictable: the rapidly growing Georgian military budget181 and 
the announced aspirations for membership in NATO, encouraged by the United States, 
were signals that could not be misinterpreted or neglected by Moscow. The fact that 
Moscow was militarily prepared182 in advance for such a war with Georgia confirmed 
that the intentions of Saakashvili toward South Ossetia and Abkhazia were known, or at 
least expected, in The Kremlin.  
The war would cause territorial losses for Georgia that Tbilisi would not 
recognize—among them an obstacle for its future NATO membership. For Russia, the 
war would become the tipping point in its foreign policy. This time, the message was 
clear: the bear was back. 
D. GEORGIA 
Beyond the geopolitical context, Georgia is minuscule in territory and population, 
and not a threat to Russia, nor could Russia gain any reputation by fighting such a minor 
power; therefore, we have to scrutinize the relations between Russia, the West, and 
Georgia. The 2008 Russia–Georgia war should be explored in a global context, because 
“without uncovering meanings and emotions behind international relations, we are 
unlikely to adequately explain and predict state actions.”183 
180 Oleg Shchedrov, “Over 10 Russian peacekeepers killed in S.Ossetia-agencies,” Reuters, August 8, 
2008.  
181 Georgia - Military expenditure, Index Mundi. 
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Explaining the significance of Georgia and the entire area will allow us to 
evaluate and realize the level of risk both parties—the U.S. and Russia—were willing to 
accept in order to defend or reject the status quo. 
1. The Geopolitical Significance of Georgia 
In October 2006, the U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, had a meeting 
with President Putin in the Kremlin. One of the major topics of the meeting was Georgia. 
In her memoir, Rice described her dialogues with Putin. The words of Rice were, “any 
move against Georgia will deeply affect U.S.-Russian relations.” Putin’s answer was, “If 
Saakashvili wants war, he will get it. And any support for him will destroy our relations 
too.”184 Certainly, Georgia was an essential piece of the geopolitical grand chessboard 
that both the U.S. and Russia wanted to have under control.  
To realize how important the war against Georgia was for Russia, one must 
understand the overall geopolitical picture around Georgia. Georgia is a country in the 
Caucasus region of Eurasia.185 The strategic geographic location of the country, being 
the crossroads of Western Asia and Eastern Europe makes it of a higher importance for 
the major geopolitical actors. Georgia has a territory of 69,700 square kilometers (26,911 
square miles), and its population is about 4.5 million.186  
The Eurasian Balkans comprise a large area that includes parts of Southeastern 
Europe, Central Asia, parts of South Asia, the Persian Gulf area, and the Middle East. 
Nine countries form the Eurasian Balkans: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. With the exception of 
Afghanistan, the rest were part of the Soviet Union. The Eurasian Balkans serve as an 
avenue directly linking the West with the East. All this makes the Eurasian Balkans 
184 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor (Broadway Books, 2012), 533. 
185 Eurasia is “the globe’s largest continent and is geopolitically axial.”185 Dominating Eurasia 
would mean dominating the world. Three quarters of the world’s population lives there; moreover, nearly 
75 % of the natural resources on the planet are in Eurasia. Zbigniew Brzezinski explains the significance of 
Eurasia for the United States very clearly, arguing that “For America, the chief geopolitical prize is 
Eurasia.” Beginning with Genghis Khan, whoever controls the so-called Eurasian Balkans or New Balkans, 
controls Eurasia; therefore, “America’s global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how 
effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained” (The Grand Chessboard, 30). 
186 Georgia, The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency. 
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vulnerable to armed conflict for world dominance, especially considering their economic 
value: “an enormous concentration of natural gas and oil reserves is located in the region, 
in addition to important minerals, including gold.”187  
The Caucasus is a region, situated on the border of Europe and Asia, between the 
Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, which makes it a weighty part of the Eurasian Balkans. It 
is divided on northern and southern parts. The northern Caucasus is part of Russia, while 
the southern part consists of several states, three of which are former Soviet Republics—
Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. In addition to Russia, only these three states can be 
considered as nation states historically. This explains why, after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian nationalism gained support and 
popularity among the people. It also explains the U.S. interest in these three countries, 
attempting to exploit the susceptibility of nationalistic and anti-Russian movements there, 
a practice that later would be observed in the early stages of the Ukrainian crisis.  
To control the Eurasian Balkans, one should dominate the Caucasus. To dominate 
the Caucasus, one should gain control or influence over the independent countries in the 
Southern Caucasus. This principle is in force for both the U.S. and Russia. The difference 
is that Russia maintains control over the northern part of the Caucasus, as well as 
Armenia, while the U.S. maintains control over Azerbaijan and Georgia. Russia’s 
perception, however, is that through Georgia, the U.S. would try to destabilize the 
Northern Caucasus, which include Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, 
and North Ossetia–Alania. Some of these republics are significantly vulnerable to Islamic 
terrorism; therefore, Russia has more resolute for preventive military actions against 
Georgia, signaling the U.S. 
 
 
187 Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, 124. 
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2. The Significance of Georgia to the United States: Motives in 
Supporting Georgia  
It is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges capable of dominating 
Eurasia and thus of also challenging America. 
–Zbigniew Brzezinski 
In 1997, Zbigniew Brzezinski argued, “America is now the only global 
superpower, and Eurasia is the globe’s central arena. Hence, what happens to the 
distribution of power on the Eurasian continent will be of decisive importance to 
America’s global primacy and to America’s historical legacy.”188 The decisive role of 
the United States in Eurasia depends on U.S. policy toward the Eurasian Balkans, which, 
in turn, strives to make certain that no state or states have the power to dominate the 
area.189  
Numerous events occurred on the international political arena between 1997 and 
2008, thus changing the picture. Nevertheless, the U.S. had been building its foreign 
policy on the 1997 premise of one world superpower, when neither China nor Russia was 
a significant factor. It is hard to argue whether the U.S. did not understand the multiple 
signals sent by Russia since 2000 for its determination to defend her national interests, at 
least in the near abroad area. It is possible that the U.S. did understand the message, but 
chose not to give up the status quo that Russia was trying to challenge. However, the 
level of risk that the U.S. was willing to accept was not enough to deter Russia’s 
determination for changing the status quo.      
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, influence in the Caucasus became one of 
America’s geostrategic goals. The Caspian Sea, one of the richest gas and oil areas 
worldwide, had to be shared among five states, to keep it from becoming a Soviet lake.  
In 1999, during a conference on “The Geopolitics of Energy into the 21st 
Century,” Brzezinski argued that if Russia managed to stabilize Chechnya, it would 
threaten the U.S. interest in the Caucasus, because “the neo-colonial thinkers in Moscow” 
188 Ibid., 194. 
189 Ibid., 148. 
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would have focused toward the Southern Caucasus, which meant toward Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, or the U.S. pipelines projects. Brzezinski stated, “If Georgia falls under the 
influence of Russia, the pipelines, and by extension, the economic and political pluralism 
of Central Asia, would be at stake.”190 He also argued that,  
A subordinated Georgia would give Russia access to Armenia, already 
Moscow’s dependency [sic], thereby cutting off Azerbaijan (as well as 
Central Asia) from the West while giving Moscow political control over 
the Baku-Supsa [Georgia] pipeline.191 
To effectively counter Russia’s role in the Caucasus by limiting Russia’s access, 
control, and monopoly over the natural resources in the area, the United States needed to 
influence at least two friendly regimes out of the three former Soviet states—Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia. To export the resources, besides Azerbaijan, being the source of 
the natural resources, an avenue from Central Asia to Europe was necessary, and this 
avenue was either through Armenia or Georgia. Azerbaijan, the Southeast neighbor of 
Georgia has been historically associated with Turkey; being a Muslim country, 
Azerbaijan strongly fought domination by Orthodox Russia. This bolstered Azerbaijan to 
find in the face of the United States the support it needed to minimize its vulnerability to 
potential Russian aspirations of reintegration. As a result, the very nationalist Baku was 
quickly alienated from Moscow. Azerbaijan provided the U.S. access to the natural 
resources of the Caspian Sea, as well as its corridor to Central Asia. Granting an access, 
though, was not enough for America: transportation of the resources depended on 
building a pipeline and completely avoiding Russian control. The pipeline had to reach 
Turkey, and the only possibilities were the territories of either Armenia or Georgia. Being 
in an armed conflict with Azerbaijan for decades, Armenia was unlikely to abandon 
Russia, because Russia provided Yerevan with weapons and granted security against 
other Muslim states, or any threat coming from Turkey, Armenia’s historical enemy. The 
only option for the U.S. remained Georgia. After the Rose Revolution led by Mikheil 
Saakashvili, the second Georgian President, Eduard Shevardnadze, resigned. In January 
190 Scott Thompson, Conference at SCIS: the geopolitics of energy, Exclusive Intelligence Review 
(Volume 26, Number 51, December 24, 1999), 27. 
191 Ibid., 30. 
 53 
                                                 
2004, pro-NATO and pro-West Saakashvili became the third President of Georgia, and 
Georgia initiated an anti-Russian policy, which was the ultimate goal of the United 
States.  
Having Georgia and Azerbaijan on its side, while diminishing Russian influence, 
the United States increased its power upon the rich oil of the Caspian Sea; thus, the 
Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline became operational in 2006, which provided a 
crude oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. Russia’s monopoly on 
exporting the oil, obtained by the former Soviet Republics, was eventually disrupted. 
Further increasing its influence in the Caucasus, and more broadly the New Balkans, the 
U.S. would create future opportunities for building additional pipelines, thereby ignoring 
Russia. Thus, the U.S. would be able to eventually take over Russia’s share of the 
European oil and gas market. This would inevitably affect Russia’s GDP to a larger 
extent: as of 2013, the trade in both oil and natural gas provided Russia 70 percent of its 
$515 billion annual export revenue ($360.5 billion) according to the U.S. Energy 
information Administration.192 Trade in oil and gas constituted 14 percent of Russia’s 
GDP, which in 2013 was estimated to be $2.553 trillion. 193 As a result, multiple 
second and third order effects such as slowing down or stopping Russia’s military 
rearmament program, and decelerating both Russia’s economic diversification, and 
industrial modernization processes would occur. Moreover, deteriorated economic 
conditions, would impact people’s approval for the regime, potentially leading to 
protests, revolution, and even regime change. Russia, once economically and socially 
unstable inside, would be forced to change her foreign policy. Subsequently, the U.S. 
would effectively counter for an indefinite time-period Russia’s ambition to change the 
status quo, eliminating a major opponent not only in Eurasia, but globally.  
In addition, by having Georgia and Azerbaijan as allies, the United States would 
be able to deploy significant military forces and potentially use them in any future 
offensive against Iran, which in 2008 was seen by the United States as a threat to U.S. 
192 Steve Hargreaves, Russian energy should keep flowing, CNN, March 3, 2014. 
193 Russia, The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency. 
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national security and to the security of its allies in the area, which is not a surprise. To 
date, Iran is developing better relations with Christian Armenia than with Islamic 
Azerbaijan. Certainly, admitting Georgia to NATO would seal a constant U.S. military 
presence in the region. Eventually, the U.S. might deploy elements of the antiballistic 
shield, additionally limiting Russia’s room to maneuver and exercise pressure over any of 
the former Soviet states.  
3. Significance of Georgia for Russia: Motives Behind the Intervention 
in Georgia 
In general, whatever was determined to be a gain for the United States would be a 
loss for Russia: it was a zero-sum game. For Russia, if Georgia became a member of 
NATO, both countries would consider each other as enemies. Through Georgia, the 
United States would destabilize the predominantly Muslim populated Caucasus republics 
in Russia (Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan). Russia still remembers the two wars in 
Chechnya, and its leadership would not allow such destabilization to happen again. The 
Caspian Sea is very important for Russia as well. Concerning Iran, Russia is interested in 
having a stable and friendly regime; however, in the case of war between Iran and the 
U.S., a regime change in Iran would be very likely to occur.  
Being an Orthodox country, Georgia has very strong cultural and historical ties to 
Russia. Moreover, Georgia is considered part of the Russian civilization, and is still 
perceived by the Russians as part of the “Russian world,” undoubtedly, as part of the 
Russian area of interests and influence, directly related to its national security. Georgia 
voluntarily became part of the Russian empire in 1801, during which time the Russian 
empire provided protection to Georgia against Persia. Throughout the entire XIX century, 
defending its economic, cultural, and security interests in the Caucasus, Russia fought 
and won decisive battles against Persian, Turkish, and British forces.194 Russia’s policy 
today is a continuation of that same policy. Certainly, it is not because Russia wants to 
achieve an ultimate supremacy in the area.  
194 Andrei P. Tsygankov,”Blaming Moscow.” 
 55 
                                                 
Russia’s major concern is stability: providing a secure environment is priority for 
Russia, because without it, Russia will not be able to promote its cultural and economic 
interests throughout the rest of the sovereign states in the area: “Moscow does not seek to 
establish its hegemony and imperial control in the Caucasus. Instead, it wants to see the 
area as a stable and secure environment conducive to promoting Russian economic and 
cultural interests.”195  
Russia views itself as an established honest broker and a guarantor of 
peace in the Caucasus, and that perception is widely supported by the 
public at home. Indeed, a number of the small nations in the region 
perceived Russia favorably. These constituencies upheld and promoted 
Russia’s more assertive actions toward Georgia, which they viewed as the 
bully in the region. They were largely supportive of Russia’s decision to 
wage the war and recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia.196  
In fact, Russia, considered itself Georgia’s historic protector, and when Georgia rejected 
Russia in favor of the U.S., Russia felt humiliated,197which motivated Russia to 
intervene.   
Stabilization cannot be achieved without solving several major problems in the 
area: “secessionism, the expansion of Western military infrastructure, the militarization 
of Caucasian countries, and great-power rivalry over energy.”198  
The expansion of Western military infrastructure included plans for Georgia in 
NATO, a move which Russia considered a direct threat. This perception was supported 
by 77 percent of the Russians who considered Georgia’s admittance to NATO 
unacceptable.199 In addition, U.S. elements of the antiballistic shield in Georgia would 
mean further vulnerability of Russia’s nuclear forces.   
Militarization of the Caucasus meant the constant supply of weapons to both 
Azerbaijan and Georgia by the United States, which triggered Russia to supply Armenia, 
195 Ibid.  
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Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. To rearm the Georgian military, Saakashvili increased the 
military expenditures over 12 times beginning in 2004. In 2003, when the Revolution of 
the Roses occurred, the military budget of Georgia was $96,300,000 or 1.1 percent of its 
GDP. When Saakashvili became President, the budget in 2004 was $134,000,000 (1.4 
percent of GDP); in 2005, it was $357,000,000 (3.3 percent of GDP); in 2006, it was 
$607,000,000 (5.2 percent of GDP); and in 2007, it was $1,201,000,000 (9.2 percent of 
GDP). In 2008, the budget slightly declined to $1,140,000,000 (8.5 percent of GDP).200 
However, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the values are 
even higher, although the percentage of GDP is almost the same. In 2008, the maximum 
value of $ 1,625,000,000 was reached.201 In addition, over the past decade, Washington 
provided Tbilisi with $1.2 billion in aid.202 After 2008, defense spending began to 
drastically decrease reaching $451,000,000 (2.9 percent of GDP) in 2012,203 which may 
be explained with the de facto secession of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the 
unambiguous positions of Moscow.  
Secessionism has been the other major problem for Russia in the Caucasus. 
During the conflicts, some areas in Georgia such as the Pankisi Gorge and others near the 
border with Chechnya were used by the international terrorists as avenues of approach 
from the Southern to Northern Caucasus. Terrorists today use these ways to conduct their 
attacks in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia.  
When the so-called First Chechen War began, U.S. President Clinton responded 
by stating, “it is an internal Russian affair.”204 
In his memoirs, Strobe Talbott wrote, “what little we did know about Chechnya 
and Dudayev inclined us to accept Moscow’s version that it was dealing with an ugly 
200 Georgian Military Budget, MilitaryBudget.org. 
201 Georgia - Military expenditure, Index Mundi. 
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mixture of secessionism and criminality.”205 Moreover, as Michael McFaul admits, “U.S. 
intelligence sources suggested that international supporters of Chechens were enemies of 
the United States.”206  
With the beginning of the Second Chechen War, the U.S. and Western Europe 
began to accuse Russia of initiating a military operation against the terrorists, although 
the U.S. already knew that the Chechen terrorists had ties with Osama bin Laden and 
other terrorists from Saudi Arabia.207 Moreover, Russia initiated the operation in 
response to several terrorist acts conducted by Chechen terrorists, who also invaded 
Dagestan. This was admitted by the U.S. administration.208 Nevertheless, the problem 
was not labeled an “internal affair” anymore, and U.S. officials changed their language 
toward Moscow.209 Outside the White House, politicians criticized the “weak” policy of 
Clinton toward Moscow. 
A significant anti-Russian view was expressed by Zbigniew Brzezinski,210 who 
along with Alexander Haig and Max Kampelman, formed the American Committee for 
Chechnya.211 In the founding declaration of the anti-Russian committee, it was declared 
that, “There is no excuse for inaction. The United States should immediately announce a 
comprehensive plan to deter Russian aggression, provide humanitarian relief to the 
Chechen people, and begin a process of bringing the war to a negotiated end.”212 Before 
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the U.S. Senate, Brzezinski called the war “genocide” against the Chechens.213 
Brzezinski called for boost of American—Chechen relations.214 
President Clinton would say that, “Russia will pay a heavy price for those actions, 
with each passing day sinking more deeply into a morass that will intensify extremism 
and diminish its own standing in the world.”215 Putin would answer that if the West was 
“really so worried” about the war, “let them use their influence . . . not only in order to 
bring some sort of pressure to bear on the Russian leadership.”216  
By the end of 1999, the West considered imposing economic sanctions on Russia. 
Also, it was suggested to freeze Russia’s membership in the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe.217 For Russia, Chechnya was “the front line against 
international terrorism,” and it was “a Russian internal affair.”218  
In November 1999, Russia’s Minister of Defense blamed the U.S. for trying to 
gain control over the Northern Caucasus.219 Russia’s Minister for Federal and 
Nationalities Affairs, Vyacheslav Mikhailov, also blamed the U.S. and Western Europe 
for the instability of the Caucasus. He said, “there is a tremendous interest in the 
Caucasus, which is a sphere of geopolitical and geostrategic interests of the whole world, 
the U.S. of course, West European countries and some others.”220 
The former member of the U.S. National Security Council, Richard Pipes,221 
argued that “in militarily opposing the secession of Chechnya, the Kremlin was acting in 
213 Zbigniew Brzezinski, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 12, 2000 
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an imperialist and expansionist manner”,222 disrespecting the fact that Chechnya was a 
legitimate part of Russia. (In 2004, after the terrorist attacks on a school in Beslan, the 
Republic of North Ossetia–Alania, the Russia Federation, when 334 victims died, half of 
them children,223 Richard Pipes argued that Chechnya should be granted 
independency,224 thus “righting an old wrong.”225)   
On August 26, 1999, as Prime Minister, Putin directly blamed the West for the 
instability in the Northern Caucasus saying that “some states are declaring the North 
Caucasus as a zone of their vital interests; even though it is Russian territory, some are 
helping separatists with weapons and ammunition.”226 
Russia developed a perception that the U.S. was interested in destabilizing the 
Caucasus through the war in Chechnya, and encouraging the Islamists there. For Russia, 
if Chechnya broke away, other Russian Republics might initiate a struggle for their 
independence, eventually, leading to further disintegration of Russia. This perception was 
first publicly announced by President Yeltsin in 1997, claiming the U.S. viewed the 
Northern Caucasus “as part of its sphere of influence.”227 
In November 1999, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, made clear that 
Moscow “will resolutely resist attempts to force it out of the Caucasus and the Caspian 
region.”228 He stated,  
An evident battle for spheres of influence is under way in the Caspian 
region and the Caucasus…individual states located thousands of 
kilometers from these strategically important regions have declared them 
to be zones of vital interest ... attempts are being made to supplant Russia 
and other states, particularly Iran, in those regions. But those are the 
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countries for which the Caspian region and the Caucasus are indeed vitally 
important.229 
If for the United States, Georgia and the Caucasus are about national interests, for 
Russia, the Caucasus is not simply about national interests; it is about national security, 
including survival. 
It became clear that Georgia played an important for both the U.S. and Russia. To 
some degree, the future of Central Asia would be definitive for the future of Russia, and 
both parties were aware of that. The higher the value of the Caucasus was for the United 
States, the higher the motivation for Russia became to defend its national interest on its 
borders. The victory over Georgia scored huge geopolitical capital for Russia. As Andrei 
Tsygankov argued, “Russia was prepared to go it alone over Georgia because its security 
interests in the Caucasus are the last thing the Kremlin is ready to give up.”230  
4. Recent History of Georgia and Russo-Georgian Relations  
Russia is a country that defines its future based on the past. The history plays a 
pivotal role for the Kremlin’s decision-making. In this section, we will provide a 
retrospection of the recent history of Georgia and its relations with Russia. 
On March 17, 1991, a referendum on the future of the Soviet Union was held. 
Georgia was one of the six Soviet Republics that refused to vote; however, Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia participated in the referendum. Ninety-nine percent of the voters were for 
preservation of the Soviet Union.231   
On March 31, 1991, Georgia held a referendum to restore  its independence. 
Officially, over 98 percent of the voters expressed their will for independence. South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia mostly boycotted the vote. Georgia officially proclaimed 
independence on April 9, 1991.232  
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The proclaimed independence of Georgia further increased the security concerns 
among Abkhazians and South Ossetians. The security issues first appeared in the end of 
1980s, when the disintegration process of the Soviet Union became evident. Without 
going into details, we will focus on the major issues between Georgia on one hand, and 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other, which led to the 2008 war.  
5. Abkhazia  
From 1921 to 1931, Abkhazia was a republic within the Soviet Union; however, 
instead of being subordinated to Moscow, it was subordinated to Tbilisi. Since that time, 
Abkhazians have organized multiple protests and demonstrations against Georgian rule, 
the most significant of which were in 1967, 1977–1978, and 1989. Just as a similar 
process of struggling against the Socialist regimes in most of the former Soviet satellites 
gave birth to national movements based on the intelligentsia of the respective countries, a 
national movement in Abkhazia emerged as well.233 Eventually, on July 23, 1992, 
Abkhazia declared its independence from Georgia. 
6. South Ossetia 
The South Ossetian Autonomous Region was within the Georgian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (GSSR). During the era of the Soviet Union, in contrast to the Abkhazians, 
South Ossetians and Georgians lived without any interethnic issues. In fact, the separatist 
movements and the struggle for independence occurred because of the “Georgia for the 
Georgians” policy conducted by the first President of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who 
was elected in 1992.234  
Instead of working to unite the diverse population in Georgia—of whom around 
30 percent were non-Georgians235—Gamsakhurdia alienated the ethnic groups within 
Georgia. In 1989, Gamsakhurdia called the Ossetians “trash that has to be swept out 
233 Paul A. Goble, “How the South Ossetians Became ‘Separatists,’” New York Times, September 22, 
2008.  
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through the Roki Tunnel.”,236237 He later would suggest banning Georgian citizenship to 
those who could not prove their ancestors had lived in Georgia before 1801.238 “[I]n 
Georgia,” New York Times columnist Paul A. Goble noted, “there are Ossetians, but no 
Ossetia.”239 
On September 20, 1990, the Ossetians proclaimed the South Ossetian Democratic 
Republic within the Soviet Union.240 On December 11, 1990, Tbilisi declared the South 
Ossetian republic illegal, and revoked its autonomous status within Georgia.241 
Gamsakhurdia justified his decision by saying, “they [the Ossetians] have no right to a 
state here in Georgia. They are a national minority. Their homeland is North Ossetia.... 
Here they are newcomers.”242  
7. Georgian Civil War 
Orchestarted by Gamsakhurdia, the nationalistic and hostile policy toward the 
ethnic minorities in Georgia led to a civil war. Besides the military coup to overthrow 
Gamsakhurdia—followed by his unsuccessful attempt to retake power—the major 
episodes involved the two wars against South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Tbilisi aimed to 
prevent secession of the regions; however, the de facto wars led to secession of both 
regions. 
The Georgia-South Ossetia War was fought 1991–1992. On June 22, 1992, a 
cease-fire was reached known as the Sochi agreement, signed by Eduard Shevardnadze 
(de facto President of Georgia), and Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, in the presence of 
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the leaders of North and South Ossetia. Russia’s led peacekeeping forces were to keep 
the agreement.243  
The Georgia-Abkhazia War was fought from 1992–1993. Through Russia 
mediation, a ceasefire between the fighting parties was agreed upon in Sochi on July 27, 
1993; however, it was broken in September by the separatists. Eventually, a cease-fire 
was reached when Georgia completely lost control over Abkhazia.244 Finally, on May 14, 
1994, the Agreement of a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces was signed by Georgia and 
Abkhazia. The agreement was recognized in the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 934. UN peacekeeping forces were appointed to monitor the compliance of 
the agreement.245  
8. The 2001 Kodori Crisis 
Once Putin came de facto to power, he initiated a second military campaign in 
Chechnya. For Putin, it was clear that Russia could not start building global status unless 
stability at home was achieved. On October 1, 1999, Russian troops entered Chechnya.246 
In October 2001, there was an armed conflict in the Kodori Valley, Abkhazia, 
between Chechen fighters and Abkhazian forces.247 On October 8, 2001, a helicopter of 
the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was shot down while 
conducting an inspection flight. Nine men died, including five UN observers.248 Russia 
blamed the Chechen fighters hiding on Georgian territory who were fighting against 
Abkhazian forces and attacking Russian forces in Russia. Russia officially accused 
Georgia of assisting international terrorists, and warned that Russia could resort to self-
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defense in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter and conduct pre-emptive strikes against 
terrorists’ bases on Georgian territory.249  
9. From the Revolution of the Roses to the 2008 War 
Although fragile, the peace lasted until January 2004, “when an aggressive and 
impetuous Georgian nationalist, Mikheil Saakashvili, was elected president.”250 President 
Eduard Shevardnadze, convinced by Russia, resigned to avoid bloodshed in Tbilisi. After 
ruling Georgia for over 30 years, Shevardnadze remained the last and the longest-serving 
Soviet-era post-independence president.251 
Moscow hoped that the new leadership in Tbilisi would work to restore “the 
traditions of friendship” between both countries, while Saakashvili stressed that he would 
work to improve the relations between Russia and Georgia. Saakashvili not only admitted 
the fact that there were Chechen fighters on Georgian territory, but expressed 
resoluteness to fight them.252  
In May 2004, an economic forum was held between Russia and Georgia, where 
Moscow made multiple economic concessions such as restructuring Georgia’s debt, 
supplying electricity, easing the issuance of visas, and easing the labor market.253  
Also in May 2004, Russia managed to peacefully solve the so-called Adjara crisis. 
Adjara is an autonomous republic in Georgia. The crisis was about to turn into a military 
confrontation. Russia prevented the conflict and any possibility of secession of Adjara 
from Georgia, thus saving face for the new Georgian President. It was a great example of 
how both countries would work to solve the problems within Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. However, the “friendly” relationship between Russia and Georgia ended when 
Saakashvili announced that Georgia wanted to join the EU and NATO.254 
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Saakashvili tried unsuccessfully to regain control over South Ossetia during the 
summer of 2004, saying, “the Georgians were forced into a humiliating withdrawal, but 
their violation of the status quo infuriated the Russians.”255 This only served to add fuel 
to the relations with Russia. 
In May 2005, Russia agreed to withdraw its troops from the Soviet era military 
bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki, Georgia. Although the bilateral agreement requested 
that Russian troops withdraw by 2008,256 the troops were removed by December 
2007.257  
In January 2006, a pipeline explosion occurred in North Ossetia. Georgia 
remained without gas, which brought electrical and heat shortages, causing a diplomatic 
tension between Moscow and Tbilisi.258 
In February 2006, the Georgian parliament issued a resolution stating that Russian 
peacekeepers had to leave the break-away regions.259 As a reaction, Russia stopped 
issuing visas,260 and the Georgian wines were banned in March 2006 from the Russian 
market.261 
In September 2006, a spy scandal additionally increased the temperature between 
both states, when Georgia arrested four Russian intelligence officers for spying. A very 
harsh reaction from Russia followed when Russia’s Defense Minister, Sergei Ivanov, 
said, “all [recent] actions by Georgian authorities can be characterized as utterly 
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outrageous, as an open desire to provoke the Russian Federation.”262 Russia suspended 
the pullout of its troops, and many Georgians working in Russia were deported.263  
In 2007, Saakashvili promised his supporters in Abkhazia that “they would be 
home within a year.”264 
In January 2008, Saakashvili was reelected. Although he again claimed that he 
would work toward improving relations with Russia, Moscow questioned the legitimacy 
of the elections.265   
On the global stage, two major events contributed to the increase of the 
temperature between Russia and Georgia. On February 17, 2008, the U.S.-backed 
Kosovo declared independence from the Russian ally Serbia.266 The 20th NATO Summit 
was held in Bucharest, Romania on April 2–4, 2008.267 Both Ukraine and Georgia were 
encouraged to become NATO members, although they were not offered a Membership 
Action Plan, which was postponed to a December 2008 meeting.268 
In March-April 2008, Georgia began a military build-up near the borders of the 
two breakaway regions. Russia reacted immediately by extending additional political and 
military support to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Putin stated that, “Any attempts to apply 
political, economic or especially military pressure on Abkhazia and South Ossetia are 
futile and counterproductive.”269 Russia also considered the option to recognize 
independence to both separatist regions.270  
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Moscow sent a signal to the West, expressing its dissatisfaction about the 
international events. The other recipient was Tbilisi: “the message for Georgia was that a 
NATO membership might come only at the expense of its territorial integrity; thus, 
following the August 2008 war, Moscow did recognize the independence of the two 
breakaway areas.”271 
On April 20, 2008, a UAV belonging to the Georgian military was shot down 
over the Abkhazia. Georgia blamed a Russian Mig-29 for shooting down the drone, an 
allegation which eventually proved to be true.272  
On April 30, 2008, Russia accused Georgia of building-up troops in the Kodori 
regions, deploying 1500 soldiers, and for eventually planning to retake Abkhazia.273 
Russian response on the military build-up was instant. On May 8, 2008, the Russian 
Ministry of Defense stated that Russia had increased the number of her peacekeeping 
forces in Abkhazia to 2,542 out of the 3,000 allowed by the international 
agreement.”274  
By the morning of August 7, 2008, Georgia concentrated 12,000 troops on its 
border to South Ossetia, and 75 tanks and armored personnel carriers were deployed near 
Gori.275  
E. THE WAR 
[A] stronger Russia, reacting to NATO’s encouragement to both Ukraine 
and Georgia for eventual alliance membership as well as plans for 
installing U.S. missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech 
Republic, caused Russia to tighten its grip on its near abroad, their 
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traditional security buffer, and eventually invade Georgia and annex 
territory.276 
On August 7, 2008, 12,000 Georgian troops were on the border of South Ossetia. 
Seventy-five tanks and armored personnel carriers were positioned near Gori.277 
“Georgia launched a massive artillery barrage and incursion to retake the South Ossetian 
capital of Tskhinvali.”278 At least ten Russian peacekeepers were killed and thirty 
wounded.279 Almost 400 South Ossetians were killed.280   
On the morning of August 8, 2008, Georgia claimed control over Tskhinvali. 
Meanwhile, Russian forces entered Georgia, reaching Tskhinvali at noon on the same 
day. On the morning of August 9, Russian troops gained control over the South Ossetian 
capital.281  
On August 10, Georgia asked for a ceasefire. Medvedev stated that Moscow 
would accept a ceasefire only if Georgia withdraw its troops “prior to conflict and pledge 
not to use force.”282 On August 11, the U.K, followed by the U.S. condemned the 
Russian invasion.283 On August 12, Saakashvili agreed to Russia’s ceasefire conditions, 
and signed a ceasefire in Moscow.  
On August 13, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO), including Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, condemned Georgia: “Under the pretext of re-establishing 
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territorial integrity, Georgia, in essence, conducted genocide again the Ossetian 
people.”284 
On August 14, Russia’s President Medvedev stated that Moscow would support 
“any decision made by the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on their status.”285 On 
the same day, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, said the U.S. would not become 
involved in the conflict.286 
On August 15, the U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, made a “visit of 
support” to Georgia. She also presented the Sarkozy-Medvedev peace plan to 
Saakashvili, which was signed by the Georgian President.287  
On August 16, President Medvedev officially signed the six-point Sarkozy-
Medvedev peace plan. Later the same day, the U.S. President called Saakashvili to 
“express support for him and for the people of Georgia.”288 
1. Moscow’s Injured Reputation: Why did Russia go to War with 
Georgia? 
“The continued expansion of NATO is especially important in explaining 
Russia’s willingness to use force in the Caucasus.”289 
After his election, President Saakashvili forgot about his promises to work on 
improving Georgia–Russia relationship, and rejected any proposal for a peaceful 
settlement of the situation around the breakaway regions. Russia viewed itself as an 
“honest broker and a guarantor for peace in the Caucasus,”,290291 as well as a historic 
protector of Georgia292 for two centuries (since 1801); therefore, Moscow felt humiliated 
284 Ibid.  
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286 Ibid.  
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because instead of recognition, Tbilisi confronted Moscow, dismissing their historical, 
cultural and religious relations, and relying on the support of the United States. This 
additionally enforced Russia’s suspicion regarding the U.S. interest in the Caucasus.293 
During the 2004 economic forum between Russia and Georgia, Saakashvili 
promised to respect Russia’s security interests in the Caucasus by not allowing foreign 
troops on the territory of Georgia after the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Soviet 
era military bases;294 however, Saakashvili admitted the presence of Chechen fighters on 
the territory of Georgia even as Russia expected the two nations to solve their problems 
together. Instead of that, however, Georgia invited U.S. advisors to train and equip 
Georgia’s troops. Saakashvili did not keep his promise of not hosting foreign troops. The 
U.S. presence in Georgia was seen by Russia as disrespect of its interest, and as an 
attempt to limit Russia’s influence in the area.  
Another example of where Moscow’s position was disrespected was the U.S. 
global strategy of changing Washington regimes in the immediate area of Russia’s 
interest (not only in Georgia, but in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan between 2003 and 2005). 
The so called color revolutions were perceived by Moscow as an attempt to erode 
“Russia’s stability and its prestige as a power on its own right.”295  
F. THE OUTCOME AND CONCLUSION 
The war had a huge global resonance, and forced the West to reconsider its 
policymaking toward Russia. The U.S. support for Georgia to join NATO, along with 
U.S. economic assistance and both U.S. military equipment and training, as well as the 
participation of Georgian troops in the U.S. led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan led 
Saakashvili to develop a sense of confidence he would receive further U.S. support in the 
case of military operation against South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Nevertheless, the 
expectations of Tbilisi were not justified: this otherwise not quite rational adventure of 
293 Tsygankov and Matthew Tarver-Wahlquist, “Duelling Honors.”  
294 Ibid. 
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Saakashvili, followed by Russia’s military intervention, turned into political and military 
disaster for the regime in Tbilisi, and a triumph for Moscow. 
1. Military Disaster 
The numbers of military losses on each side differ according to the source. 
Georgia said it suffered 154 military deaths, stating that 400 Russian military had been 
killed, while Russia said it lost 64, and Georgia lost almost 3,000.296   
In fact, the battles between Georgian and Russian troops lasted less than two days, 
and the Georgian defense collapsed very quickly. The two Georgian assault brigades sent 
to fight were destroyed. The Georgian troops, especially the reservists, retreated in panic, 
and many defected. A considerable amount of military equipment was left behind. From 
August 11–15, the military facilities in Gori built with U.S. financial support were 
destroyed by Russian bombers and missiles. The Russian troops kept a trophy of up to 
150 units of heavy armament including tanks, armored infantry vehicles, armored 
personnel carriers, vehicles, guns, and surface-to-air systems. “Radar installations, 
ammunition depots, and armored vehicles, everything was and is being either destroyed 
or appropriated for the benefit of the Russian state.”297  
Since his election in 2004, Saakashvili focused on creating capable military 
forces, equipped with modern Western weaponry. Georgia spent up to 9.2 percent of its 
GDP for its armed forces.298 The Georgian Army was trained by U.S and U.K advisors, 
which means that the tactics, technics, and procedures of the Georgian troops should be 
the same as those of the U.S. Army (127 U.S. instructors were in Georgia when the war 
began).299 Moreover, tens of Georgian officers undergo numerous courses in the U.S. on 
annual basis. The structure of the Army was close to the one in the U.S. During the 
conflict, the Georgian Army was provided with radio-technical reconnaissance and 
296 “Rossiiskaya razvedka obvinyaet Gruziyu v sokrtytostii msshtaba poter,” Lenta.ru, September 15, 
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electronic warfare equipment, night vision, and modern communications, which means 
they were better equipped than the Russian Army. However, the level of training and 
readiness of the Georgian Army was not as qualified as it appeared. Besides the Army’s 
heavy losses, the Georgian Air Force, Navy, and Air Defense systems practically ceased 
to exist. Eventually, “those who believe in the a-priori superiority of the West in military 
affairs have learned yet another unpleasant lesson from the Georgian affair.”300    
The [Russian] soldiers destroyed key bridges, railroad lines, and roads. 
The military victor went to great lengths to humiliate the loser, which had 
allowed itself to be provoked into an attack.301  
From 2003–2008, the U.S. invested over $180 million in the Georgian military. 
Multiple Georgian officers received training and military education in the United States, 
and 1,000 military advisers from Israeli security companies participated in training the 
Georgian forces. Weapons, intelligence, and electronic warfare equipment was purchased 
from Israel.302 Certainly, the U.S. was aware of Georgian plans to try to solve the issue 
militarily.303 Putin would say after the war that “...it is not just a matter of the U.S. 
administration being unable to restrain the Georgian leadership from this criminal action; 
the U.S. side had in effect armed and trained the Georgian army.”304 Georgia became the 
“outpost of the West against Russia;”305 therefore, the war with Georgia was a proxy war 
with the West, particularly with the United States. Finally, Russia exploited the 
opportunity for “payback for the humiliation that Russia suffered in the 1990s, and its 
answer to NATO’s bombing of Belgrade in 1999, and to America’s invasion of Iraq.”306 
For Moscow, the five-day war was not only a victory over a small neighbor, but a victory 
over the United States. As American historian, Herbert Bix, and Japanese Political 
300 Mikhail Barabanov, “Three military analyses of the 4 day war between Russia and Georgia,” The 
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scientist, Kato Tetsuro, argued, the war became “a proxy conflict pitting Russian 
nationalism against American imperialism.”307 Russia lost in Kosovo, but won in 
Georgia: “...the reality is there was a serious miscalculation about the Russian ability to 
translate rhetoric into action.”308  
The American political scientist and founder of STRATFOR, George Friedman, 
would later state that Russia’s operation in Georgia “was carefully planned and 
competently executed, and over the next forty-eight hours, the Russians succeeded in 
defeating the main Georgian force and compelling a retreat.”309 It was recognition for the 
credibility of the Russian military.    
2. Political Disaster 
On August 26, 2008, Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev signed decrees, thus 
recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as sovereign states.310 
After decades of conflicts with its two regions, the territorial loss for Georgia became 
fact. The independence that the West granted Kosovo became a catalyst for recognizing 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia: “In international relations, you cannot have one 
rule for some and another rule for others,” Russia’s President Medvedev said.311 
For Prime Minister Putin, just like in 2014, when Crimea became, at least de 
facto, a part of Russia through recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, the war became a means for fixing historical injustice. “When the Soviet 
Union was formed, these territories, by Stalin’s decision, were definitively given to 
Georgia. As you know, Stalin was ethnically Georgian. Therefore, those who insist that 
307 Herbert P. Bix, “The Russo-Georgia War and the Challenge to American Global Dominance,” The 
Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, October 10, 2008. 
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those territories must continue to belong to Georgia are Stalinists: they defend the 
decision of Josef Vissarionovich Stalin.”312  
3. Miscalculations or Underestimating Russia’s Reputation for Resolve 
A nation forgives injury to its interests, but not injury to its honor. 
–Max Weber 
Georgia relied on the U.S. to provide both military and political support that 
would serve as a deterrent factor before the newly elected Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev, who was not expected to be as much a hardliner as his predecessor Putin. It 
may be assumed that the U.S. did not expect Russia to react in such a manner; otherwise, 
Washington would not have allowed Saakashvili to initiate this military adventure. Putin 
went further in his assumptions, stating that the U.S. leadership had an interest in a 
prolonged war between Russia and Georgia to divert the U.S. public’s attention from 
domestic and international problems, thus uniting them to support one of the two political 
parties during the upcoming presidential elections. Putin said there had been indications 
that U.S. citizens had participated in the war, fighting against Russia;313 therefore, for 
Moscow, the war became “a definite geopolitical/military response to a perceived existential 
threat to the Russian nation-state.”314   
Knowing that the U.S. was behind Georgia since 2003, Russia had even greater 
motivation to act decisively, signaling not only to tiny Georgia and the Ukraine, but to 
the United States. “The proxy American-Russian war in Georgia, in August 2008, which 
risked a nuclear confrontation like the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, was an unmistakable 
warning. Russia has a right, as the United States asserted for itself in that crisis, to be free 
of menacing foreign military bases near its territory.”315 
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Undoubtedly, the U.S. had the military capability to engage Russia militarily; 
however, the will to act depends on the level of risk that a state is ready to take, which is 
defined by the status quo prior the conflict. However, if the U.S. did go to war with 
Russia, Washington did not have a lot to gain, but did have a lot to lose. We may confirm 
that with an excerpt from the memoir of the U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, 
who recalls,  
The next morning [August 12, 2008] I gave up on any notion of a vacation 
and returned to Washington. The President [George Bush] was back from 
Beijing, and Steve [Hadley–Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs] was able to gather the NSC [National Security Council] 
for a meeting. The session was a bit unruly with a fair amount of chest 
beating about the Russians. At one point Steve Hadley intervened, 
something he rarely did. There was all kind of loose talk about what 
threats the United States might make. “I want to ask a question,” he said in 
his low-key way. “Are we prepared to go to war with Russia over 
Georgia?” That quieted the room, and we settled into more productive 
conversations of what we could do.316 
When we discussed loss aversion, we argued that, “losses loom larger than 
gains,”317 meaning that the U.S. preferred not to intervene, because it could result in 
serious reputational loses. During a military confrontation between the only two 
superpowers, definitely America was in a gains frame, which meant less will to take a 
risk. Russia was in a losses frame; therefore, Moscow was willing to take a risk. 
“Russians felt humiliated by the situation and were increasingly prepared to do anything 
to change it.”318 Therefore, Russia struggled to change the status quo, which determined 
its “willingness [resolve] to use force to protect state’s foreign-policy interests,”319 
thereby, gaining a reputation for deterring future challengers.  
Evoking the statement that, “domestic opinion operates according to Prospect 
Theory in finding even small losses so painful that it prefers high risks to accepting them, 
316 Rice, No Higher Honor, 688–689. 
317 Levy, “An introduction to prospect theory,” 175 
318 Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International 
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319 Huth, “Reputations and deterrence: A theoretical and empirical assessment,” 75. 
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and will punish any leader who permits them to occur,”320 helps us to explain why Russia 
did not hesitate to react and to send troops into Georgia. In fact, the “domestic aspects of 
honor as well as material capabilities will also figure prominently in shaping Russia’s 
international behavior.”321 
Domestically, Russians disliked the U.S.’s open support for Georgia. This was 
perceived as intervention in Russia’s interests, even in Russia’s internal affairs, since 
Georgia was for almost two centuries part of Russia/USSR. During the years 1991–2000, 
Russian society’s accumulated anger toward the U.S. because of its intervention in 
Russia’s internal affairs increased the national support for Putin, who was seen as 
opposing the Western arrogance toward Russia.  
Certainly, there is a correlation between humiliation and reputation: the greater 
the power (economic, military) of a state, the higher the reputation, and the lower 
susceptibility to humiliation. The weaker (economic, military) a state, the lower the 
reputation, and the more susceptible to humiliation; therefore, after almost a decade of 
misery, since 2000, domestically, the wealth of the Russians increased drastically. 
Parallel to the Russia’s growing reputation internationally, the Russian society’s sense of 
humiliation also augmented. “In response to Russia’s perceived humiliation in the arena 
of international relations and its growing domestic strength, a consensus emerged in favor 
of an assertive foreign policy style for achieving the objectives of development, stability, 
and security,”322 which was viewed by the Kremlin as “Russia’s great power 
pragmatism.”323 Due to these dramatic changes within Russian society, “Moscow is 
unlikely to back off when it has full support at home and when the perceived honor of a 
great power is at stake.”324 As was expected, Russia’s actions against Georgia met 
approval by the majority of the Russians. Russian society, just like the state of Russia, 
was tired of humiliation, tired of being treated without respect. For most of the Russians, 
320 Jervis, “Political implications of loss aversion,” 189. 
321 Tsygankov and Matthew Tarver-Wahlquist, “Duelling Honors.”  
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Russia’s success in the war increased their pride, patriotism, and nationalism: it meant, 
“Russia was back.” Seventy percent stated that, “South Ossetia should either become part 
of Russia or win independence.”325 
Any hesitation and attempt for peaceful decision through statements, negotiations, 
would be seen not only internationally, but domestically, as a weakness. It would then 
immediately reflect on the popular support for the Kremlin, and eventually lead to 
internal destabilization. At that time, Russia’s foreign policy “was largely supported by 
both elites and the general public at home;”326 moreover, “in response to Tbilisi’s 
provocative and militarist behavior, many in Russia felt that tough reciprocal actions 
were fully justified.”327 The adventure of Saakashvili was expected by Russia. 
Saakashvili was irrational or unreasonable enough to initiate a violent attack against 
South Ossetians, which was exactly what Russia wanted: an opportunity to demonstrate 
its determination to defend its national interests and to build a reputation for resolve.   
Recalling the U.S. war in Korea, Thomas Schelling maintains, “We lost thirty 
thousand dead in Korea to save face for the United States . . . , not to save South Korea 
for the South Koreans, and it was undoubtedly worth it. Soviet expectations about the 
behavior of the United States are one of the most valuable assets we possess in world 
affairs.”328  
North Koreans were armed and trained by the Soviets,329 just like the U.S. armed 
and trained the Georgians.330 During the Korean War, however, neither the Soviets nor 
the Americans were in losing/winning frames. The Cold war had just begun; therefore, it 
was imperative for both superpowers to build a reputation for resolve before their 
adversaries, and a reputation for commitment before allies. In the case of the Russia–
325 Anne Barnard, “Russians Confident That Nation Is Back,” New York Times, 15 August 2008 
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Georgia War, however, the U.S. expectations about the behavior of Russia were the most 
valuable assets Russia was struggling to build. The primary reason for Russia to go to 
war with Georgia was to gain a reputation for resolve and to make clear that it would not 
tolerate any further attempt to be disrespected or humiliated, directly or indirectly. 
Unlike in the Korean War, the U.S. decided to save lives, instead of saving face. 
Russia, similarly to the Soviet intervention in Hungary during the revolution in 1956, by 
going to war with Georgia, demonstrated resoluteness to preserve the status quo in the 
area (de facto independence of the two regions). Like in 1956, in 2008, the U.S. did not 
act not because the Russians were stronger: it did not act, because Russia was militarily 
capable enough and overwhelmingly motivated to collide with the West, if necessary. 
While the U.S. was not ready to accept the risk, Russia was. As Jeffrey Berejikian argues, 
“The key to maintaining credibility is the proper manipulation of rival perceptions about 
hidden costs through the judicious use of threats and aggression.”331 This time Moscow 
had the key. 
“The reputation that matters most to us is our reputation with the Soviet (and the 
Communist Chinese) leaders. It would be bad enough to have Europeans, Latin 
Americans, or Asians think that we are immoral or cowardly. It would be far worse to 
lose our reputation with the Soviets,”332 argues Schelling. In 2008, Russia could not 
accept losing any reputation with the United States. Moscow drew its red line: it sent 
multiple signals to the West to stop encouraging Georgia to join NATO; moreover, 
Russia warned Georgia to avoid any military attempt to resolve the situation with the 
breakaway regions. Once Georgia initiated the attack, killing Russian soldiers and 
civilians, Russia had no option, but to react, because the red line was already crossed. 
Russia’s credibility was at stake. Additionally, Russia viewed itself as guarantor for 
peace in region - a perception shared by the nationalities in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.333 It meant that Russia had to prove its commitment and defend them.  
331 Jeffrey Berejikian,”A cognitive Theory of Deterrence,” Journal of Peace Research, 2002. 
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333 Tsygankov, Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin, 253. 
 79 
                                                 
Due to the war, Russia guaranteed its military presence in the two recognized 
republics, which meant military presence in the Northern Caucasus. Georgia and most of 
the states did not recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent, and still 
considered them part of Georgia; however, with territorial issues, Georgia deprived itself 
of a NATO membership, which was one of the goals of Russia. Through the war, “Russia 
has shown that it will not continue to bow to Western strategic goals within their perceived 
sphere of influence.”334  
Finally, since we began with Schelling, we finish with him:  
What one does today in a crisis affects what one can be expected to do 
tomorrow. A government never knows just how committed it is to action 
until the occasion when its commitment is challenged. Nations, like 
people, are continually engaged in demonstrations of resolve, tests of 
nerve, and explorations for understandings and misunderstandings.335 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
If reputation is a property, as in “a property, something that can be owned, 
controlled, accumulated, and spent,”336 as most of decision makers and strategists believe 
it to be, fighting for it is consistent with the Prospect Theory, as staking one’s reputation 
will push the state into a losses frame, and a willingness to pay a heavy price to defend it. 
However, the majority of scholars agree, at least in theory, that reputation is a function of 
others’ perceptions: an actor, then, theoretically, cannot exercise full control over others’ 
perceptions of him. Thus, “there seems to be a gap…between politicians’ persistent 
obsession with reputation and scholars’ increasing doubt about a reputation’s importance, 
and the gap is increasing.”337 The obsession with the misplaced notion of self-reputation 
pushes decision makers into the vortex of disproved, yet platitudinized, rhetoric of, “if we 
stand firm this time, there will be no next time.”338 This is partly the result of politicians’ 
lack of “nuanced understanding of credibility, reputation, resolve, and capability,” 
leading them to “fight for behavioral reputation for resolve and hope to improve their 
bargaining reputation (thus credibility) in the future.”339 Besides, while states constantly 
care for a reputation assigned to them based on their past behavior, they seldom assign 
any reputation to other states based on their past behavior.340 
The policy implications of leaders’ obsessions with reputation and their perceived 
control over it can be enormous. Empirical testing demonstrates that “Schelling’s notion 
of reputation building [to which most decision makers ascribe] can be conceived in a 
proactive sense, that is, as a driving force behind initiating, rather than simply deterring, 
conflicts for purposes of “saving face.”341 Moreover, the losing face can potentially 
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stymie rapprochement and prolong crises, as decision makers assume that a conciliatory 
policy could question their reputation.342 
Our thesis was not intended to prove or disprove whether and how significantly 
reputation matters in international relations in general, and whether reputation is worth 
fighting for. We aimed to explore the issue from a different angle: regardless of its 
significance, states have actually been going to war for their reputations for resolve that 
supposedly would deter others from initiating hostile actions. We demonstrated that 
decision makers generally believe that allies and adversaries infer the state’s resolve from 
its behavior, and employ war itself in order to develop, preserve, or restore a reputation 
for resolve. Because of the policy implications of this belief, there is a need for further 
research to collect and analyze evidence regarding whether statesmen do draw such 
inferences from their allies and adversaries’ past behavior. 
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